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Progress Is Our Only Product:
Legal Reform and
the Codification of Evidence
Michael Ariens
Twentieth-century reform of the American law of evidence was initially
premised on the ideals of legal progressivism, ideals splintered by American
legal realism. In preparing the American Law Institute's Model Code of
Evidence from 1939 to 1942, Harvard Law School professor Edmund M.
Morgan attempted to reconstitute the framework of reform in light of the
challenge of legal realism. The Model Code was based on granting greater
discretion to the trial judge and changing the goals of the trial from a search
for truth to a "rational" resolution of disputes. In large part due to these
apparently radical and "corrosive" changes, the Model Code failed to win
professional support and was not adopted by any state. The structure of the
Model Code was used for the two subsequent evidence codfcation efforts,
the Uniform Rules of Evidence and the Federal Rules of Evidence. These
codiication efforts found greater academic favor in part because they fit
within the post-World War II jurisprudence of reasoned elaboration. The
Federal Rules also enjoyed extraordinary professional favor because the draft-
ers explicitly affirmed truth as the goal of the rules. The irony is that the
framework of the Federal Rules, since they are based on the Model Code,
contradicts this message.
I. INTRODUCTION
The story of 20th-century American legal thought is often told as a
history of labels, from Sociological Jurisprudence through Critical Legal
Studies and beyond. If people play any role, it is as characters, emblems of
theories they apparently represent. Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., for exam-
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pie, is cast as either the demonic positivist or the mature "modern" jurist.
Lon Fuller characterizes the secular Natural Law scholar.! Additionally,
modern American legal thought is often structured as a story of Law in the
abstract; Law as heavenly conception versus Law as social fact. What is
missing from these pictures is the relationship of legal thought and sub-
stantive legal doctrine. Fierce "intramural" debates about the efficacy of
change in legal doctrine may serve as a proxy for a larger battle among
divergent jurisprudential views. Conversely, differences among competing
jurisprudential views may mask underlying similarities, similarities that re-
duce the differences from a clash of "paradigms" into another intramural
struggle, albeit one at a broader level than a doctrinal debate. Under-
standing particular doctrinal disputes in light of their shared assumptions
may provide a ground-level perspective from which to assess shifts in 20th-
century American legal thought.
My concern in this article is to discuss recent American jurispruden-
tial currents by locating them in an unlikely place: the work of Harvard
Law School Professor Edmund M. Morgan,2 specifically his work as Re-
porter to the American Law Institute's (ALl) Model Code of Evidence. I
contend that Morgan, although not considered a jurisprudential thinker
like a Lon Fuller, crafted the Model Code of Evidence as a jurisprudential
response to both the devastating criticism of the trial process by "realists"
like Leon Green, Thurman Arnold, and Edward Robinson, on the one
hand, and to the (then) "reactionary" views of John Henry Wigmore and
the practicing legal profession, on the other hand. Morgan's efforts to
structure the Model Code of Evidence were an attempt to re-form the
ideals of legal progressivism, to find a "middle way" between the extremes
that threatened the legal order. Instrumentally, the Model Code was a
failure, since no state adopted it. However, the drafters of the Uniform
Rules of Evidence used the Model Code as the basis for codifying the law
of evidence, and the drafters of the Federal Rules of Evidence (FRE) ac-
knowledged using the Uniform Rules as their starting point. With the
enactment of the Federal Rules of Evidence in 1975 and with the adoption
1. Compare Robert S. Summers, Lon L Fuller (Stanford, Cal.: Stanford University
Press, 1984), with Peter Read Teachout, "The Soul of the Fugue: An Essay on Reading
Fuller," 70 Minn. L Rev. 1073 (1986). But see John Henry Schlegel, "The Ten Thousand
Dollar Question," 41 Stan. L Rev. 435 (1989), reviewing Laura Kalman, Legal Realism at
Yale, 1927-60 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1986) ("Kalman, Legal
Realism") (suggesting the necessity of individualized portraits to understand American legal
realism).
2. Morgan received bachelor's, master's, and law degrees from Harvard University, the
last coming on 1905. He practiced law in Duluth, Minn., for seven years before he joined
the faculty at the University of Minnesota School of Law, In 1917 Morgan joined the Yale
Law School faculty, where he remained until 1925, when he returned to his alma mater.
Morgan retired from Harvard in 1950. He then began teaching at Vanderbilt Law School,
where he taught until 1963. He died in 1966. See Mason Ladd, "Edmund M. Morgan-In
Memoriam," 79 Harv. L Rev. 1546 (1966).
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by 34 states of evidence codes modeled on the FRE, the structure and theory
of the Model Code survived in the FRE, although this was and is rarely
acknowledged. 3
The parentage of the Federal Rules of Evidence is rarely acknowl-
edged in part because of the notoriously short memory of Americans (and
American lawyers) and in part because recognizing the theory of the
Model Code requires the legal profession to confront painful issues the
legal profession has tried to avoid for 50 years. The particular issue raised
by the Model Code was its denial that the rules of evidence exist to ascer-
tain the truth. The more general rules raised by the reaction to the Model
Code, and to subsequent evidentiary codification efforts, is the idea of
progress. In the study of the law and reform of the rules of evidence,
almost all legal scholars and the entire legal profession have avoided dis-
cussing these issues. 4 Thus, articles praising or condemning the extent of
judicial discretion in the Federal Rules of Evidence brush only gently
against those unarticulated assumptions governing the idea of judicial
discretion.
To understand the context in which the Model Code of Evidence was
framed requires a discussion of the rise of legal progressivism in the early
20th century as well as the impact of those academics branded legal realists
in the 1930s. The spectacular failure (and later success) of the Model
Code of Evidence may allow us to understand notions of legal reform and
that post-World War II jurisprudence categorized as reasoned elaboration
or legal process.
3. There was a brief mention of the Model Code of Evidence. "The Committee ac-
knowledges its indebtedness to its predecessors in the field of drafting rules of evidence.
The American Law Institute Model Code of Evidence, Uniform Rules of Evidence, New
Jersey Rules of Evidence, and California Evidence Code, with their supporting studies and
commentaries, were invaluable in suggesting general approaches and organization as well as
particular solutions." Letter of Submission to Standing Committee on Rules of Practice and
Procedure, 46 F.R.D. 173, 180 (1969) (written by Albert E. Jenner, Jr., chairman of the
Advisory Committee on Rules of Evidence).
4. The exception, in my view, is Kenneth Graham. See 21-25 Charles Alan Wright &
Kenneth W. Graham, Jr., Federal Practice and Procedure (St. Paul, Minn.: West, 1977-89)
("Wright & Graham, Federal Practice"); Kenneth W. Graham, Jr., "'There'll Always Be an
England': The Instrumental Ideology of Evidence," 85 Mich. L Rev. 1204 (1987), reviewing
William Twining, Theories of Evidence: Bentham and Wigmore (London: Weidenfeld & Nicol-
son, 1985) ("Twining, Theories of Evidence"); id.; "The Persistence of Progressive Procedural-
ism," 61 Tex. L Rev. 929 (1983), reviewing Julius Byron Levine, Discovery: A Comparison
between English and American Civil Discovery Law with Reform Proposals (1982).
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II. AMERICAN LEGAL THOUGHT AND LEGAL
REFORM
A. Introduction
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, implemented in 1938,5 and the
Federal Rules of Evidence, enacted in 1975,6 are designed, we are told, to
promote the "just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every ac-
tion." 7 They are to be "construed to secure fairness in administration,
elimination of unjustifiable expense and delay, and promotion of growth
and development of the law of evidence to the end that the truth may be
ascertained and proceedings justly determined." 8 The stated goals of these
transsubstantive rules, then, are that the truth be determined and disputes
be justly resolved.9
The foundational assumptions underlying the claim that the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure and the Federal Rules of Evidence are instru-
ments that permit the discovery of truth and the "just" resolution of dis-
putes are three related phenomena: first, the general "optimistic
rationalism" 10 pervading most of Western legal and intellectual thought
from the Enlightenment;1' second, the legal "progressivism" ' 2 of influen-
5. In the Rules Enabling Act of 1934 Congress authorized the Supreme Court to pre-
scribe general rules of practice and procedure, which were to become effective if Congress
took no action during a regular congressional session to nullify them after being reported to
Congress. 28 U.S.C. S 2072 (1934). By order dated 20 Dec. 1937, the Supreme Court
adopted the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which were then transmitted to Congress by
the Attorney General in Jan. 1938. Congress took no action during that congressional
session to nullify the new Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. On 16 Sept. 1938, the Rules
became effective. See text accompanying notes 71-77.
6. Rules of Evidence, Pub. L. 93-595, 88 Star. 1926 (1974).
7. Fed. R. Civ. P. 1.
8. Fed. R. Evid. 2.
9. See text accompanying notes 130-39, discussing the change from perceiving the
rules of evidence as a way to ascertain the truth to a perception of the rules as part of the
process of creating a politically convenient way to settle disputes.
10. Twining, Theories of Evidence vii; see also Lawrence M. Friedman, A History of Amer-
ican Law 663-64 (2d ed. New York: Simon &_ Schuster, Touchstone, 1985) ("Friedman,
History of American Law") ("This state of mind is part of the general debris of a world-wide
movement of recent centuries that can be called, for want of a better name, rationalism");
Calvin Woodard, "The Limits of Legal Realism: An Historical Perspective," 54 Va. L Rev.
689, 691-94 (1968) (noting that the process of secularization of society is based on the
growth of rationalism, the development of science, and the invention of new technology);
John Merryman, The Civil Law Tradition 28-29 (2d ed. Stanford, Cal.: Stanford University
Press, 1985) (discussing the influence of the spirit of "optimistic rationalism" on the codifi-
cation of French private law in the Code Civil of 1804).
11. Twining, Theories of Evidence 1-18. See also William Twining, "Evidence and Legal
Theory," 47 Mod. L Rev. 261, 272 (1984); id., "The Rationalist Tradition in Evidence Schol-
arship," in Enid Campbell & Louis Waller, eds, Well and Truly Tried 211, 242-49 (1982)
("Twining, 'Rationalist Tradition' "). In "Evidence and Legal Theory," Twining notes that
this pervasive optimistic rationalism has been challenged in the history of ideas by the
thought of "Croce, Collingwood, Freud, Mannheim, Marx and Weber," id. at 274, and in
legal thought by "contemporary writing on judicial processes." Id. I believe that the "oppo-
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tial early to mid-20th-century American reformers,' 3 who acted as catalysts
for both procedural and evidentiary reform; and third, the jurisprudential
reaction to American legal realism, which coalesced after World War II
into legal process or reasoned elaboration.' 4
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the Federal Rules of Evi-
dence were explicitly presented as means to the goals of "truth" and "jus-
sitional" thought of Freud, Marx, and Weber remains largely that, and "most" legal and
intellectual thought is pervaded by Enlightenment thought. Cf. Alasdair Macintyre, After
Virtue (2d ed. Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 1984). Additionally,
Twining cites no writers discussing the judicial process. A recent compilation of divergent
thought concerning the judicial process is Stephan Landsman, American Bar Association Sec-
tion of Litigation Readings on Adversarial Justice: The American Approach to Adjudication (St.
Paul, Minn.: West, 1988).
12. See generally G. Edward White, "From Sociological Jurisprudence to Realism: Ju-
risprudence and Social Change in Early Twentieth-Century America," 58 Va. L Rev. 999
(1972).
13. On William Draper Lewis, former dean of the University of Pennsylvania School of
Law and founder and executive director of the American Law Institute, see N. E. H. Hull,
"Restatements and Reform: A New Perspective on the Origins of the American Law Insti-
tute," 8 Law & Hist Rev. 55, 81-86 (1990). See also 21 Wright & Graham, Federal Practice
at S 5005 ("There can be little doubt of the ties between the A.L.I. and legal scholars of
Progressive political leanings, for the Institute was led for many years by William Draper
Lewis, former Dean of the University of Pennsylvania Law School and an active Progres-
sive").
On Charles E. Clark, dean of the Yale Law School and Reporter for the Advisory
Committee drafting the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, see 4 Charles Alan Wright &
Arthur Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1004 (St. Paul, Minn.: West, 1987) ("Wright
& Miller, Federal Practice"). Clark was dean of Yale Law School from 1929 until 1939, when
he was appointed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. See Eugene V.
Rostow, "Judge Charles E. Clark," 73 Yale LI. 1 (1963); see generally Kalman, Legal Realism
115-40 (cited in note 1). John Henry Wigmore was author of the definitive treatise of the
law of evidence, A Treatise on the Anglo-American System of Evidence in Trials at Common Law
(1st ed. 1904-5; 2d ed. 1923; 3d ed. Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1940) ("Wigmore, Trea-
tise"). See Edmund M. Morgan, Book Review, 20 B.U.L Rev. 776, 793 (1940) ("Not only is
this the best, by far the best, treatise on the Law of Evidence . . ."). In Theories of Evidence
172, Professor Twining cites approvingly a description of Wigmore as "the last Mid-Victo-
rian." I agree with this assessment, but Wigmore was a legal progressive, as distinct from a
legal formalist. It is true, however, that his political conservatism led him to urge the ABA
to join the fight against Communism during the first Red Scare of 1919-21 and caused him
to rail against those legal academics who supported Sacco and Vanzetti in the mid- to late
1920s. An interest in legal reform does not and did not require a political liberalism or
progressivism. See, e.g., Friedman, History of American Law, 674 (" 'Law reform,' in the
sense the organized bar uses this term, is really a measure for professional defense."). On
Wigmore, see William R. Roalfe, John Henry Wigmore: Scholar and Reformer (Evanston, Ill.:
Northwestern University Press, 1977) ("Roalfe, Wigraore"). The most important legal pro-
gressive was Roscoe Pound, whose 1906 speech to the American Bar Association, later pub-
lished under the title "The Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction in the Administration of
Justice," 29 A.B.A. Rep. 395 (1906) ("Pound, 'Popular Dissatisfaction' "), was the catalyst for
legal progressivism.
14. See G. Edward White, "The Evolution of Reasoned Elaboration: Jurisprudential
Criticism and Social Change," 59 Va. L Rev. 279 (1973); Edward A. Purcell, Jr., The Crisis of
Democratic Theory: Scientific Naturalism and the Problem of Value 159-78 (Lexington: Univer-
sity Press of Kentucky, 1973) ("Purcell, Crisis of Democratic Theory") (showing the early reac-
tion against realism); Akhil Amar, "Law Story," 102 Hart. L Rev. 688 (1989) (review essay
of the third edition of Hart & Wechsler's The Federal Courts and the Federal System).
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tice" in part due to this broader Western and narrower American
intellectual milieu. These goals were also channeled by a deep public and
professional reverence for both Law and the Rule of Law. Finally, the legal
profession was dedicated to the beauty and utility of the adversary system,
the hallmark of the "Anglo-American" system of adjudication. These ex-
plicit statements were not part of the wellspring of the Federal Rules of
Evidence, the American Law Institute's 1942 Model Code of Evidence.
Part of the failure of the Model Code of Evidence was due to its apparent
disavowal of these goals.
The abiding belief of early 20th-century legal progressive thought was
that legal reform could rationally aid in the progress of a legal system to-
ward consensual notions of "truth" and "justice." Legal realism, while
having little contemporary impact on the legal profession, shattered a juris-
prudential faith in legal progress toward truth and justice. The restructur-
ing of legal progressive thought into reasoned elaboration or legal process
after World War II required a fundamentally different justification for a
"rational" and progressive administration of justice. This justification,
however, was unacceptable to a legal profession then essentially unaffected
by legal realism. While legal academics could not longer faithfully argue
that the goal of the trial was truth, nor that the administration of justice
was concerned with substantive rather than procedural justice, the legal
profession and the public continued to believe in both goals. Invoking the
goals of truth and justice to garner public and professional support was
necessary to the passage of the Federal Rules of Evidence; the structure of
the Federal Rules, because it is based on the Model Code of Evidence,
undermines those goals.
B. Optimistic Rationalism
William Twining describes the tenets of "optimistic rationalism" as a
congery of beliefs in truth, reason, and justice under law.' 5 Events occur
independently of human observation, and past events can be truthfully
reconstructed in the present, although "establishing the truth about al-
leged past events is typically a matter of probabilities or likelihoods falling
short of compete certainty."' 6 Ascertaining the truth is accomplished by
listening to experts explain and interpret relevant data and through the
"common-sense" generalizations of society.' 7 In adjudicating disputes, es-
tablishing the truth must be based on relevant evidence and justice can be
accomplished only if the truth is established on the basis of relevant evi-
15. Twining, Theories of Evidence viii (cited in note 4).
16. Id. at 13.
17. Id. at 14.
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dence. Further, justice can be accomplished only if the method of fact
finding is "rational." Rational decision making means making decisions
based on inferences from relevant evidence. Rational decision making
based on relevant evidence will thus lead the fact-finder to the truth and to
"correctness"' 8 in decision making. The search for truth, then, is at the
core of a system of justice. Since, however, decisions about the truth of
factual allegations occur in an imperfect, human setting, the concern for
justice is not a concern for an idealized justice but a justice under [positive]
law,19 which means that truth will not always be discovered or a correct
decision rendered and further means that the goal of "correctness" may be
matched or superseded by other social goals.
The "Anglo-American" system of adjudication-the adversary sys-
tem-structures and channels these tenets of optimistic rationalism. Un-
like trial by compurgation or trial by ordeal, the adversary system was
perceived as a rational system for the discovery of truth20 and the pursuit
of justice. In the adversary system, each participant, with the notable ex-
ception of the parties, plays a significant role in fulfilling the requirements
of optimistic rationalism. The attorneys for the parties investigate and sift
the facts pertinent to their (opposing) cases and offer and object to the
introduction of evidence; the judge impartially decides disputed issues of
law, including the admissibility of evidence; and the jury, given the con-
flicting evidence presented by both parties and instructions on the applica-
ble law by the judge, decides the disputed issues of fact and renders a
verdict for a party. This system provides checks on abuses by counsel (by
the judge), by the judge (by counsel on appeal), and by the jury (through
jury instructions, limiting their purview to issues of "fact" and, in egre-
gious cases, permitting the court to render a judgment notwithstanding the
verdict or to inquire into the validity of the verdict), and so limits any
departures from rationality.2'
C. Legal Progressivism and Procedural Reform
The story of the codification of the rules of evidence is further linked
to the story of legal progressivism, for the interest in a code of evidence
18. Twining uses the phrase "rectitude of decision." Id.
19. Id.
20. See 5 Wigmore, Treatise S 1367 (3d ed. 1940) (cross-examination "is beyond any
doubt the greatest single engine ever invented for the discovery of truth"). See also Twin-
ing, Theories of Evidence 161 (cited in note 4) ("Wigmore placed far more emphasis on the
role of the law of evidence as a means for promoting the search for truth than on its role in
constraining that search in the interest of other values and policies"). See text accompany-
ing notes 130-39.
21. Cf. Pound, "Popular Dissatisfaction" at 404-5 (disparaging the ideal that a trial
was a sporting contest and pleading for a procedure allowing a judge to independently
search for truth and justice).
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rules is based on the legal progressives' spirit of legal reform. In 1904-5,
Wigmore's Treatise 2Z was published. This four-volume first edition was an
immediate critical and commercial success. Dean2 3 Wigmore became the
unchallenged authority on the law of evidence in America. 24
The publication of Wigmore's Treatise was "the most important event
in the history of the law of evidence in this century."25 Wigmore's Treatise
was not simply a compendium of cases and a rationalization of inconsisten-
cies in the law of evidence but also a call for reform. If the legal system was
to be a rational system for the discovery of truth, as Wigmore believed, the
rules of evidence needed to be applied consistently with those goals and to
be workable in practice, that is, in trials. Wigmore's ideas for reforming
the law of evidence were part of the emergence of legal progressivism, or
sociological jurisprudence,26 led by Roscoe Pound.
In 1906 Pound spoke at the annual meeting of the American Bar As-
sociation in St. Paul, Minnesota, about the reasons for public dissatisfac-
tion with the administration of justice in American courts.2 7 Among the
reasons for public dissatisfaction with the American legal system28 was
contentious procedure, which turned litigation from a search "for truth
22. Wigmore, Treatise. The first important treatise on the law of evidence in America
was written by Harvard Law School Professor Simon Greenleaf and first published in 1842.
The title of Greenleaf's book was A Treatise on the Law of Evidence. Greenleaf's treatise was
preceded in America only by Swift, Digest of the Law of Evidence, which apparently had little
impact. See 21 Wright & Graham, Federal Practice at S 5001. See also Twining, "Rational-
ist Tradition" at 231 (cited in note 11). Initially, Greenleaf's treatise was written for his
students but became the authoritative source of the American law of evidence for the rest of
the 19th century. See Twining, Theories of Evidence 5. The 16th, and final, edition of Green-
leaf on Evidence was edited by Wigmore, then a professor at Northwestern University Law
School, in 1899. Little, Brown & Company, the publishers of Greenleaf on Evidence, were
impressed with Wigmore's efforts to the extent that they asked him to author a treatise on
the law of evidence, which resulted in Wigmore's monumental Treatise. 21 Wright & Gra-
ham, Federal Practice at S 5001.
23. Wigmore was named dean at Northwestern University Law School in 1901, a posi-
tion he held until 1929. After military service in Washington, D.C., during World War I,
Wigmore preferred the appellation "Colonel."
24. The death in 1902 of Wigmore's evidence teacher at Harvard Law School, James
Bradley Thayer, and the publication of Wigmore's Treatise to replace Greenleaf left Wigmore
as the dominant evidence scholar within both legal academia and the legal profession.
25. 21 Wright & Graham, Federal Practice at S 5001. The following paragraph draws
heavily on that work.
26. See generally White, 58 Va. L Rev. (cited in note 12); See also Roscoe Pound,
"Mechanical Jurisprudence," 8 Colurn. L Rev. 605, 608-9 (1908) (contrasting a mechanical
jurisprudence with a "sociological movement in jurisprudence").
27. Pound, "Popular Dissatisfaction" at 403 (cited in note 13).
28. Id.
(1) The individualist spirit of our common law, which agrees ill with a collectivist age;
(2) the common law doctrine of contentious procedure, which turns litigation into a
game; (3) political jealousy, due to the strain put upon our legal system by the doctrine
of supremacy of law; (4) the lack of general ideas or legal philosophy, so characteristic of
Anglo-American law, which gives us petty tinkering where comprehensive reform is
needed, and (5) defects of form due to the circumstance that the bulk of our legal
system is still case law.
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and justice" 29 into a game or sport "that the parties should fight out.., in
their own way without interference."30 Decrying the sporting theory of
justice, Pound cited Wigmore for the proposition that this view inaccu-
rately depicted the adversary system. The sporting theory disfigured the
administration of justice and mistakenly led even the "most conscien-
tious" judge to believe that he was "not to search independently for truth
and justice"3i and to assume that "errors in the admission or rejection of
evidence are presumed to be prejudicial and hence demand a new trial." 32
This gave the community "a false notion of the purpose and end of law." 33
Pound's call was for a true "scientific jurisprudence" 34 based on the
use of experts to make the legal system more efficient. Making judges
"scientists" would instill in judges an expertise which would create a
greater efficiency in the administration of justice. It would also alter the
administration of justice by creating an emphasis on substantive justice in
the courts. Two years later, Pound fleshed out both these themes in a
Columbia Law Review article. The science of law was a means to the end of
"reason, uniformity, and certainty." A scientific jurisprudence was a
search for full justice, for "solutions that go to the root of the controver-
sies,"'35 for equal justice, and for exact justice. Law was scientific in order
to eliminate "the personal equation in judicial administration, to preclude
corruption and to limit the dangerous possibilities of magisterial igno-
rance." 36 The scientific administration of justice, however, was not to be
confused with a mechanistic jurisprudence, although a degeneration of
legal science could lead to stagnation and "petrifaction" in the legal
system.
The antidote to the problem of "petrifaction" was "a pragmatic, a
sociological legal science." 37 "The sociological movement in jurisprudence
is a movement for pragmatism as a philosophy of law; for the adjustment
of principles and doctrines to the human conditions they are to govern
rather than to assumed first principles; for putting the human factor in the
central place and relegating logic to its true position as an instrument. ' 38
Pound then noted that the law of procedure and evidence suffered
29. Id. at 405.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id. "The inquiry is not, What do substantive law and justice require? Instead, the
inquiry is, Have the rules of the game been carried out strictly?" Id. at 406. A related
problem was the "injustice of deciding cases upon points of practice, which are the mere
etiquette of justice." Id. at 408.
33. Id. at 406.
34. See 21 Wright & Graham, Federal Practice at § 5001.
35. Pound, 8 Colum. L Rev. at 605.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 609.
38. Id. at 609-10.
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"especially from mechanical jurisprudence." 39 An insistence on perceiving
procedure and evidence in conceptual terms led judges to view them as
ends rather than means, and Pound gave examples of this error. He con-
cluded by suggesting the enactment of "a common-sense and business-like
procedure." 40
The advent at the beginning of the 20th century of sociological juris-
prudence,41 also known as legal progressivism, progressive procedural-
ism, 42 and progressive-pragmatism, 43 was part of the general progressive
movement44 and specifically part of the intellectual departure from formal-
ism.45 Pound, the progenitor of sociological jurisprudence, relied, like all
good progressives, on the "ideology of bureaucracy" 46 to support his ef-
forts at reforming the legal system. In general, "[p]rogressivism believed in
the management of government by experts and advocated the expansion
of the executive branch, primarily in the form of administrative regulatory
agencies, at the expense of the Congress and the courts." 47 Specifically,
formalist jurisprudential theory employed a priori reasoning rather than
reasoning based on actual economic and social conditions. 48 The use of
39. Id. at 617.
40. Id at 620.
41. Roscoe Pound, "Liberty of Contract," 18 Yale LJ. 454, 464 (1909).
42. 21 Wright & Graham, Federal Practice at S 5005.
43. Hull, 8 Law & Hist. Rev. at 85 (cited in note 13).
44. On progressivism generally, see Robert H. Wiebe, The Search for Order, 1877-1920
(New York: Hill & Wang, 1967), and Richard Hofstadter, The Age of Reform: From Bryan to
F.D.R. (New York: Vintage Books, 1955). On general intellectual thought in the late 19th
and early 20th centuries, see Henry Steele Commager, The American Mind: An Interpretation
of American Thought and Character since the 1880's (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University
Press, 1950), and on developments leading up to progressivism, see Morton Keller, Affairs of
State: Public Life in Late Nineteenth Century America (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University
Press, Belknap Press, 1977).
45. See Morton White, Social Thought in America: The Revolt against Formalism (New
York: Viking Press, 1949). An excellent and empathetic exploration of legal formalism is
Thomas Grey, "Langdell's Orthodoxy," 45 U. Pitt. L Rev. 1 (1983). Grey suggests that "the
heart of classical theory was its aspiration that the legal system be made complete through
universal formality, and universally formal through conceptual order." Id. at 11.
46. See 21 Wright & Graham, Federal Practice at S 5001. The ideology of bureaucracy
was one tenet held in common by both legal progressives and realists. See Kalman, Legal
Realism 31 (cited in note 1) (discussing Clark and Arnold). On Thurman Arnold's views, see
Douglas Ayer, "In Quest of Efficiency: The Ideological journey of Thurman Arnold in the
Interwar Period," 23 Stan. L Rev. 1049, 1085 (1971) ("The isolation of efficiency from other
values led to an insistence on government by experts"); cf. Neil Duxbury, "Some Radicalism
about Realism? Thurman Arnold and the Politics of Modern jurisprudence," 10 Oxford J.
Legal Stud. 11, 21 (1990) ("Arnold, however, was no potential reformer").
47. White, 58 Va. L Rev. at 1003 (cited in note 12). In efforts to reform the law of
evidence, however, legal progressives like Edmund Morgan used the specter of administra-
tive tribunals replacing trial courts to persuade the legal profession to support evidentiary
reform. See Edmund M. Morgan, "The Future of the Law of Evidence," 29 Tex. L Rev.
587, 607-9 (1951).
48. Pound, 8 Colum. L Rev. 605 (cited in note 26). See Edmund M. Morgan et al., The
Law of Evidence: Some Proposals for Its Reform xiv (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press,
1927) ("Morgan, Law of Evidence") (denigrating evidence writers basing their decisions on "a
priori arguments").
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disinterested experts in adjudication would make the administration of jus-
tice more rational and just. Such reform was a gradual reform, conserva-
tive in the sense of taking the best from the American past and molding it
to the present. Political and legal progressives, as their name suggests, be-
lieved in the evolution of human progress, a gradual but continued move-
ment toward greater enlightenment about the human condition. As
advocates for efficiency, expertise, and progress, progressives claimed that
their movement was nonideological. All bureaucrats, including judges, if
correctly trained and learned as "scientists," could act disinterestedly in
support of progress. Finally, some legal progressives, including Pound and
Wigmore, believed in moral absolutes. While society's values were often
inchoate and in flux, there was some consensus about values.49
Pound's ideas for legal reform gradually captured the attention of in-
fluential academics and "elite" members of the legal profession. In a 1937
article looking back at the early proposals for legal reform, Wigmore called
Pound's 1906 speech "the spark that kindled the white flame of prog-
ress." 50 Wigmore noted that on the morning after Pound's speech was
given, he met with William Draper Lewis, then of the University of Penn-
sylvania, and they, along with others, "resolved to do something about it in
our own limited spheres." 5' In 1936, a writer discussing the third draft of
the proposed Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in the American Bar Associa-
tion Journal traced the movement for reform of the rules of civil procedure
to Pound's 1906 speech. 52
When Pound spoke to the American Bar Association, he was dean of
the University of Nebraska School of Law, a "hitherto obscure Nebraska
jurist." 3 Two years later, Wigmore recruited Pound to Northwestern,54
and shortly after that, he was named Story Professor of Law at Harvard
Law School. By 1916, Pound was dean at Harvard, and during his 20-year
term he consolidated Harvard's preeminence in legal education.55 The
49. See White, 58 Va. L Rev. at 1007-8. See also Pound, "Popular Dissatisfaction" at
415 (cited in note 13) ("Absolute theories of morals and supernatural sanctions have lost
their hold"). John Henry Wigmore, Preface, Code of Evidence xiii (3d ed. 1942) ("ALL THE
RULES IN THE WORLD WILL NOT GET US SUBSTANTIAL JUSTICE IF THE
JUDGES AND THE LAWYERS HAVE NOT THE CORRECT LIVING MORAL ATTI-
TUDE TOWARDS SUBSTANTIAL JUSTICE"). See also John Henry Wigmore, "The
American Law Institute Code of Evidence Rules: A Dissent," 28 A.B.A.J. 23 (1942) ("The
purpose of these formulations is not merely to restate the rules of Evidence as they are, but
as they ought to be and can predictably be") (emphasis in original).
50. John Henry Wigmore, "The Spark That Kindled the White Flame of Progress," 20
J. Am. Jud. Soc'y 176 (1937).
51. Id. at 178 (emphasis in original).
52. Edgar Bronson Tolman, "Historical Beginnings of Procedural Reform Movement
in This Country-Principles to Be Observed in Making Rules," 22 A.B.A.J. 783, 784 (1936).
53. Hull, 8 Law & Hist. Rev. 58 (cited in note 13).
54. Wigmore, 20 J. Am Jud. Soc'y at 178.
55. On Pound, see Paul Sayre, The Life of Roscoe Pound (Iowa City: State University of
Iowa, 1948); David Wigdor, Roscoe Pound: Philosopher of Law (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood
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preeminence of Pound at Harvard and Wigmore at Northwestern eased
the transition of the legal academy from formalist to "progressive-pragma-
tist" notions of jurisprudence.
In 1912, the ABA recommended the adoption of a uniform set of
procedural rules prepared by the Supreme Court for use in federal com-
mon law litigation.5 6 The next year, a midwestern lawyer named Herbert
Lincoln Harley founded the American Judicature Society for the purpose
of improving the American administration of justice.5 7 Two members of
its first board of directors were Wigmore and Pound.5 8 At about the same
time, the Association of American Law Schools recommended the crea-
tion of a juristic center for the advancement of jurisprudence. 9 The
United States's entry into World War I stalled efforts to implement this
plan,6° but they began afresh in 1920.61 Also in 1920, the Commonwealth
Fund sponsored a Legal Research Committee to aid legal reform. The
Legal Research Committee, composed of Pound, Judge Benjamin Cardozo,
and other well-known members of the legal profession, commissioned a
study on the law of evidence. 6 The chairman of the Evidence Committee
was Edmund M. Morgan, then a professor at Yale Law School. Wigmore
was named a member of the committee. 63 Two years later, the conserva-
tive Chief Justice Taft urged the merger of law and equity in a speech
before the ABA.64 That same year, a Permanent Organizing Committee
met and discussed the likely work of the newly created juristic center. 65 In
February 1923, the first meeting of that organization, now called the
American Law Institute, took place in Washington, D.C.66 The institute,
comprised of many of the most influential lawyers, judges, and legal aca-
Press, 1974). Regarding Harvard's preeminence, compare Arthur Sutherland, The Law at
Harvard: A History of Ideas and Men, 1817-1967 (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University
Press, Belknap Press, 1967) ("Sutherland, The Law at Harvard"), with Kalman, Legal Realism
(cited in note 1).
56. Tolman, 22 A.B.A.J. See also 4 Wright & Miller, Federal Practice at S 1003 (cited
in note 13). An exhaustive treatment of the reform of federal civil procedure is Stephen B.
Burbank, "The Rules Enabling Act of 1934," 130 U. Pa. L Rev. 1015 (1982).
57. Herbert Harley, "The American Judicature Society: An Interpretation," 62 U. Pa.
L Rev. (1913); see "A Salute to Herbert Harley," 58 A.B.A.J. 161 (1972).
58. Harley, 62 U. Pa. L Rev. at 353.
59. See Hull, 8 Law & Hist. Rev. at 62-65.
60. Id. at 65.
61. Id. at 67-70.
62. Morgan, Law of Evidence vii (cited in note 48).
63. Id. at viii.
64. Tolman, 22 A.B.A.J. at 784 (cited in note 52). See Burbank, 130 U. Pa. L Rev. at
1069-70. Taft had personally supported the merger of law and equity as early as 1914, as
president of the American Bar Association, and had urged procedural reforms on the model
of the English legal system as early as 1909. See id. at 1048, 1051.
65. See Hull, 8 Law & Hist. Rev. at 76-80 (cited in note 13).
66. Id. at 85.
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demics in the country, would attempt to eliminate uncertainty in the law
by drafting a Restatements of the Law.67
While the efforts to re-form and restate the law agency, contracts,
restitution, and torts were begun by the institute in 1923 and partially
concluded by 1934, and while the American Judicature Society had
drafted a model code of state civil procedure in 1919,68 "reform" of the
federal rules of civil procedure in federal courts was blocked until 1934.
The leading opponent of "reform" was Montana Senator Thomas J.
Walsh, who feared that a revision of the rules would lead to a more com-
plex procedural code like that in New York, rather than the simpler codes
found in several states in the West. 69 After his election in 1932, Franklin
Delano Roosevelt nominated Walsh as his attorney general. Shortly after
the American Bar Association disbanded its committee on procedural re-
form, which had been guided and aided by Roscoe Pound,70 Walsh died.
Roosevelt then nominated Homer Cummings for the office of attorney
general. Attorney General Cummings, noting the "consensus" of bench,
bar, and academia, urged Congress to authorize the Supreme Court to
make procedural rules. Less than a year later, after little discussion, the
Rules Enabling Act of 1934 was passed unanimously.71
The Rules Enabling Act authorized the Supreme Court to unify com-
mon law and equity pleading. In January 1935, Yale Law School Dean
Charles Clark, with James Wm. Moore,7 2 wrote an article predicting that
67. The American Law Institute eventually undertook the Restatement of the law in
nine discrete areas of private law: agency, conflicts, contracts, judgments, property, restitu-
tion, security, torts, and trusts. The institute's executive secretary was William Draper
Lewis. After listening to Roscoe Pound's St. Paul address to the ABA, Lewis joined with
Wigmore in resolving to do something to reform the American administration of justice.
Nearly 20 years later, Lewis wrote that the institute would also "promote those changes
which will tend better to adapt the laws to the needs of life." Hull, 8 Law & Hist. Rev. at 83
(quoting "Report of the Committee on the Establishment of a Permanent Organization for
the Improvement of the Law Proposing the Establishment of an American Law Institute," 1
AL Proc. (1923)). In his article "Mechanical Jurisprudence" (8 Colum. L Rev. at 622 (cited
in note 26)), Pound suggested that legal scholars test the conceptions of the common law "to
lay sure the foundations for the ultimate legislative restatement of the law."
68. See John Henry Wigmore, "A Critique of the Federal Court Rules Draft-Three
Larger Aspects of the Work Which Require Further Consideration," 22 A.B.A.J. 811, 812
(1936).
69. William D. Mitchell, "Attitude of Advisory Committee-Events Leading to Propo-
sal for Uniform Rules-Problems on Which Discussion Is Invited," 22 A.B.A.J. 780, 780
(1936).
70. Tolman, 22 A.B.AJ. at 784 (cited in note 52) ("After years of study, during all
which time Roscoe Pound continued as the mentor of the committee and its draftsman").
See also Burbank, 130 U. Pa. L Ret. at 1045-48 (cited in note 56).
71. Id. at 1095. See also 4 Wright & Miller, Federal Practice at § 1003 (cited in note
13).
72. James William Moore, born in Condon, Ore., on 22 Sept. 1905, received his law
degree from the University of Chicago in 1933. He received a J.S.D. from Yale in 1935 and
from 1935 to 1943 was an instructor at Yale. He became a professor at Yale in 1943. Moore
is the author of Moore's Federal Practice, first published as a three-volume work in 1938. 2
Who's Who in America (43d ed. 1984-85).
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procedural reform would fail unless there was a merger of law and equity
pleading.7 3 In June of that year, Dean Clark was appointed Reporter to
the Advisory Committee and Moore was named a member of the commit-
tee. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure unified common law and equity
procedure. 74 The committee published the third draft of the Rules in May
1936, and an amended version of that draft was adopted by the Supreme
Court on 20 December 1937. 7 5 When Congress failed to act to reject the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the Rules became effective on 16 Sep-
tember 1938.
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure revolutionized the theory of
procedure. The rules were broadly written. Only general features of pro-
cedure were made rules. Specific issues were left to the judge to fashion as
experience warranted. The supporters of the rules cited Pound, 76 among
others, for the proposition that broad, flexible rules provided the best
method to reform rules of civil procedure.77
The successful adoption of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the
growth and influence of reforming organizations like the American Judica-
ture Society and the ALl, and the enormous success of ALI's project to
restate the law convinced reformers that the rules of evidence should be
reformed and codified.
D. Early Evidentiary Reform Efforts
In 1910, Wigmore wrote the first evidence code, which had little ef-
fect on evidence reform.78 As noted above, in 1920, the Commonwealth
Fund's Committee to Propose Specific Reforms in the Law of Evidence
began working on reforming the law of evidence. The committee's report,
73. Charles E. Clark & James Wm. Moore, "A New Federal Civil Procedure-I. The
Background," 44 Yale LJ. 387 (1935).
74. Fed. R. Civ. P. 2.
75. 4 Wright & Miller, Federal Practice at § 1003 (cited in note 13). Justice Brandeis
disapproved of the adoption of the Rules. See West Publishing Company, Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure 6 (1989-90).
76. See Tolman, 22 A.B.A.J. at 784 (cited in note 52) (quoting Pound on the efficacy of
a general system of procedure).
77. One historian of the law of procedure has concluded that the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure is the story of the triumph of equity over common law. Stephen N. Subrin,
"How Equity Conquered Common Law: The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in Historical
Perspective," 135 U. Pa. L Rev. 909 (1987). The 50th anniversary of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure led to several ruminations on the impact of the rules on legal thought and
the legal profession. See Stephen B. Burbank, "Of Rules and Discretion: The Supreme
Court, Federal Rules and Common Law," 63 Notre Dame L Rev. 693 (1988); Stephen N.
Subrin, "Federal Rules, Local Rules, and State Rules: Uniformity, Divergence, and Emerg-
ing Procedural Patterns," 137 U. Pa. L Rev. 1999 (1989); Martha Minow, "Some Realism
about Rulism: A Parable for the Fiftieth Anniversary of the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure," 137 U. Pa. L Rev. 2249 (1989).
78. John Henry Wigmore, Code of Evidence (1st ed. 1910).
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published in 1927, contained five specific proposals.79 The author of the
Commonwealth Fund's report was Professor Edmund M. Morgan, who
had moved from Yale Law School to Harvard Law School in 1925.80 Mor-
gan's writings on evidence and his ubiquitous presence in organized efforts
to reform the rules of evidence make him as important in the development
of the American law of evidence as is Wigmore. The Commonwealth
Fund's Evidence Committee decided not to propose a model code of evi-
dence for three related reasons. First, quoting Wigmore, the committee
concluded that "[o]ur system of evidence is sound on the whle."'' s Second,
the preparation of a model code was beyond the scope of the committee. s2
Third, the bar would not accede to evidentiary reform.8 3
In its final chapter, entitled "The Outlook for Reform," the Evidence
Committee stated: First, "[riules of evidence should be so devised as to
facilitate the ascertainment of truth"; 4 second, "[discretionary power of
the trial judge over the conduct of the trial is of the very heart of effective
trial procedure,"85 but trial judges were perceived as unworthy of the bar's
trust, so reform was stymied; and third, for reform to .occur, "the tradi-
tional conservatism of lawyers must yield to the need for a more efficient
administration of justice." 86 Additionally, the committee based its specific
reforms of the law of evidence on quantitative data compiled from ques-
tionnaires sent to practitioners. The committee believed that empirical
support for proposed reforms was better than "relying on opinion and a
priori argument."8 7
Although this attempt to correlate the rules with the law in action
was primitive, it marked a difference between the "old" formalist jurispru-
dence and the "new" sociological jurisprudence. The report of the Com-
monwealth Fund's Evidence Committee was thus thoroughly based on the
ideals of legal progressivism: incremental reform, truth as the goal of the
trial, efficiency in the administration of justice, a requirement that judges
be disinterested experts who wisely used the discretion granted them, and
empirical support for reform.88
79. The proposals included giving the judge the discretion not to abide by rules of
evidence concerning matters not in dispute, allowing the judge to comment on the weight of
the evidence, abolishing Dead Man's statutes, admitting declarations of dead persons, and
simplifying and modernizing the business records exception to hearsay.
80. See note 2.
81. Morgan, Law of Evidence xii n.1 (cited in note 48) (emphasis in original). See 1
Wigmore, Treatise § 8c (2d ed. 1923).
82. Morgan, Law of Evidence xiii.
83. Id. at 68.
84. Id. at 66.
85. Id. at 67.
86. Id. at 68.
87. Id. at viii.
88. Only one proposal suggested by the Commonwealth Fund's Evidence Committee
eventually was adopted. See 21 Wright & Graham, Federal Practice at S 5005 (business
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When the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Advisory Committee to
the Supreme Court was appointed eight years later in 1935, Morgan was
named a member. Although Chief Justice Hughes apparently believed
that the Advisory Committee would include rules of evidence, the commit-
tee decided to delay work on rules of evidence, 9 except for Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 43, which concerned the mode of proof.9°
In 1938, the ABA published a report of the Committee on Improve-
ments in the Law of Evidence, a committee whose purpose was to suggest
improvements in the law of evidence.91 The chairman of the committee
was Wigmore, whose imprint is seen throughout the committee's report.
(Wigmore was the only member of the five-man committee who assented
to all the committee's general and specific proposals.) The committee
made 12 general proposals and 20 specific proposals. The proposals con-
sisted of two parts: first, general proposals to reform and improve the
administration of the laws of evidence, and second, specific rules changes.
The committee's report was based on three assumptions: (1) that there
was "a probable lack of united professional support for any radical, or
even any substantial changes"; 9 (2) that "[a]ll will agree that the body of
the rules of evidence, in their skeleton framework, are wise and whole-
some-in short, they are a valuable and unique contribution to the
world's expedients in the investigation of truth";93 and (3) that any re-
form of the rules of evidence should be undertaken through rules of court
rather than through legislative enactment.94 The most interesting of the
general proposals were the suggestions that the ABA sponsor an attempt
to draft "a short code" simplifying the law of evidence,95 that "the terms
records exception to the hearsay rule). In 1936 the ABA embraced three of the five
proposals.
89. See Wigmore, 22 AB.AJ. at 813 (cited in note 68) (noting the infeasibility of offer-
ing a code of federal evidence rules when there was no existing state code of evidence). See
also 4 Proceedings of Meeting of Advisory Committee on Rules for Civil Procedure of the Supreme
Court of the United States 974 (20-25 Feb. 1936), quoted in Burbank, 63 Notre Dame L Rev.
718 n.187 (cited in note 77) ("In a discussion about the original Advisory Committee's
power to recommend Federal Rules on matters of evidence, Professor Morgan observed: 'I
think, if you put that up to the Court, they would say, as the servant girl said, "It is such a
little baby." (Laughter)' ").
90. See Burbank, 130 U. Pa. L Rev. at 1137-43 (cited in note 56) (discussing the Advi-
sory Committee's concerns about their power to draft federal rules of evidence and their
distinguishing rules regarding the mode of taking evidence and rules regarding the admissi-
bility of evidence).
91. "Report of the Committee on Improvements in the Law of Evidence," 63 A.B.A.
Rep. 570 (1938) (" 'Report on Improvements' ").
92. Id at 570.
93. Id. at 576.
94. Id. at 571. The final general proposal adopted by the committee urged that state
legislatures "make no changes in the rules of evidence without due notice and opportunity
of hearing to the state and local bar associations." Id. at 580. This was another tenet of
progressivism, which distrusted the political nature of legislatures in favor of the "nonpoliti-
cal" impartiality of experts.
95. Id. at 576-77.
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'discretion' and 'abuse of discretion' be discarded, as having false implica-
tions; and that the trial court's ruling be ordinarily treated as final, insofar
as it involves the mere application of the rule to the facts; thus leaving to
the reviewing court its proper function, viz., the safeguarding of the tenor
of the rule." 96
In addition to the 5-member committee, an Advisory Committee of
66 members was polled concerning its agreement with the proposals. 97
One of the members of the Advisory Committee was Morgan. While
Morgan agreed with most of the proposals, he disagreed with the sugges-
tion that the terms "discretion" and "abuse of discretion" be eliminated
and with the proposal that an evidentiary ruling by a trial court be viewed
as final if it simply applied the facts to the rules of evidence.
E. The Model Code of Evidence
According to the "Introduction" to the Model Rules of Evidence,
written by ALI director William Draper Lewis, the ALL had carefully con-
sidered restating the law of evidence at some point shortly after the ALL
was created. The governing council unanimously decided against restating
the law of evidence because there "was the belief that however much that
law needs clarification in order to produce reasonable certainty in its appli-
cation, the rules themselves in numerous and important instances are so
defective that instead of being the means of developing truth, they operate
to suppress it."98 Having successfully completed most of the Restatement
of the Law, the ALL approached the Carnegie Corporation in late 1938
(shortly after the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure had become effective
and in the same year that the ABA committee called for the development
of a short, simplified code of evidence) for a grant involving the "study of
the Law of Evidence with a view not to its Restatement but to its revi-
sion." 99 After receiving a grant in 1939 from the Carnegie Foundation,
the institute's Evidence Editorial group was named. The Reporter for the
Evidence Editorial group was Professor Morgan. Named as chief consult-
ant to the group was the 76-year-old Wigmore.
A Proposed Tentative Draft of the Model Code of Evidence was
presented to the ALI Council in February 1940 and approved for discus-
sion at the ALI's annual meeting in May 1940. The discussion at the an-
nual meeting was about the divergence in evidence theory between
Wigmore and Morgan. George Wharton Pepper, president of the ALL and
96. Id. at 576.
97. No more than 44 Advisory Committee members voted on any one proposal.
98. William Draper Lewis, "Introduction," in American Law Institute, Model Code of
Evidence viii (Philadelphia: American Law Institute), 1942) ("Lewis, 'Introduction' ").
99. Id. at ix.
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member of the Advisory Committee on the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure, introduced the discussion of this draft of the Model Code:
We have not merely the usual series of questions respecting the con-
tent of particular paragraphs, but we have broad questions of policy
to consider which I suppose may be expressed somewhat thus: That
at one extreme of the field of opinion you find those who think that
the subject of Evidence should be so flexible that the trial judge
should be all but the final arbiter of what is admissible and inadmissi-
ble. At the other extreme you find the view of those who believe that
as the law of Evidence is to be a working guide for those conducting
the business of trial, it should be so specific, so detailed and so metic-
ulous that scarcely any situation should fail of specific recognition in
the system of rules. And in between is the view, which in a general
way represents what I understand to be the view of the Reporter and
his group, that a great measure of flexibility should be introduced
into the law, but that there is a such a thing as too great particulariza-
tion and that that should be avoided. 1°°
Appended to the Tentative Draft was Wigmore's dissent from the ap-
proach taken by Morgan and the rest of the Evidence Editorial group.
Wigmore proposed six Postulates as guides for the preparation of the
Model Code.'01 In his view, none of the Postulates had been followed by
the Evidence Editorial group. Therefore, according to Wigmore, any fol-
lower of Wigmore's Code of Evidence '02 would reject the Model -Code.40 3
Morgan's response, in both the Tentative Draft and before the ALl at its
annual meeting, was that all of Wigmore's Postulates except Postulate IV
had been adopted by the Evidence Editorial group. 0 4
Wigmore believed that reform of the law of evidence required both a
100. 17 ALl Proc. 64-65 (1940).
101. These Postulates formed the basis of Wigmore's Code of Evidence, the second edi-
tion of which had been published in 1935 ("Wigmore, Code 2d").
102. Id. A third edition of the Code of Evidence was published in 1942, shortly before
the ALI adopted the Model Code of Evidence.
103. See American Law Institute, Code of Evidence Tentative Draft No. I (Appendix)
112 (1940) ("ALl, Code").
104. See id. at 115; see also 17 ALI Proc. 66-70 (1940). Postulate IV stated:
This Code, in aiming as it does to become a practical guide in trials, must not be
content with abstractions, but must specifically deal with all the concrete rules exemplifying
the application of an abstraction, that have been passed upon in a majority of jurisdic-
tions; the Code specifically either repudiating or affirming these rules.-If the objection
be made that the law of Evidence should no longer remain a network of petty detailed
rules, the answers are, first, that both Bench and Bar need their guidance in order that
a normal routine be ordinarily followed for speedy dispatch at trials without discussion;
secondly, that the Bar needs them in order to prepare evidence for trial among normal
expected lines; and, thirdly, that the really effective way to eliminate the present fre-
quent overemphasis on detailed concrete rules, is to provide that they shall be only
guides, not chains,--directory, not rnandatory,-and therefore to forbid the review of the
Trial Court's rulings, except in extreme instances.
See ALl, Code (Appendix) 111-12 (emphasis in original).
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great particularity in rules and limitations on appellate review of eviden-
tiary rulings by the trial court. His disagreement with Morgan was linked
to their differing approaches to judicial discretion. Wigmore believed that
the phrase "abuse of discretion" was "mere palaver," code words for an
appellate court's disagreement with the decision of the trial court. 0 5 Since
the phrase was misleading, it should be abandoned. Instead, courts should
adhere to a rigid distinction between law and fact. Application of the rules
to the specific facts of the case should be solely within the trial court's
domain. The appellate court was only to decide issues of evidence law. 0 6
Therefore, although Wigmore was in favor of a detailed code of evidence
rules, that code should be flexibly applied because the facts of each case
varied. "The rules should be guides, not chains."' 10 7
Morgan supported a more general code of evidence rules. Broadly
written rules both encouraged trial court discretion and permitted appel-
late court oversight based on the abuse of discretion standard.'0 8 Without
referring to Wigmore, Morgan's Foreword to the Model Code indicates
another reason for his disagreement with Wigmore: "[T]he emotions of
the persons involved-litigants, counsel, witnesses, judge and jurors-will
play a part. A trial cannot be a purely intellectual performance."10 9
Ironically, Morgan's structure was aided at the 1940 ALI annual meet-
ing by the proposal of Judge (formerly Dean) Clark, who believed that
Morgan's draft was hampered by too many detailed rules for reform to re-
sult. During the discussion of the merits of the Wigmore and Morgan
approaches, Clark took the podium (at ALl President Pepper's request)
and suggested that after a period of study of two or three years, "you
would have very few [rules] that you would need to suggest. There would
be probably one broad general rule of admissibility of relevant evidence
and then certain subordinate rules that seem necessary for statement, but
there would not be included these well understood generalities such as we
have here."" 0 While Clark protested that his proposal was not at the
105. 1 Wigmore, Treatise at S 8a (3d ed. 1940) (cited in note 13).
106. Id.
107. Wigmore, Preface, Code 2d at xiii (cited in note 101). See note 104.
108. 17 ALl Proc. 70 (1940).
109. Edmund M. Morgan, Foreword, in American Law Institute, Model Code of Evi-
dence 4 (Philadelphia: American Law Institute, 1942) ("Morgan, Foreword"). Morgan be-
lieved that it was wishful thinking to expect the trial court to take an exclusively intellectual
approach to matters of evidence, and to understand detailed rules as directory rather than
mandatory, or to expect trial or appellate courts to clearly demarcate the line between issues
of fact and issues of law in evidence. See also Edmund M. Morgan, "The Model Code of
Evidence," 39 Proc. Vt. B. Ass'n 94, 100 (1945) ("If a trial is to be a rational proceeding with
a competent judge in charge, he must be given a large measure of discretion. A trial cannot
be a purely mechanical performance"). In an earlier book review, Morgan stated, "To be
sure, the jury is often swayed by sympathy and prejudice; but are trial judges motivated
solely by intellectual impulses?" Edmund M. Morgan, Book Review, 46 Harv. L Rev. 1203,
1203 (1933), reviewing Joseph N. Ulman, A Judge Takes the Stand (1933).
110. See 17 ALI Proc. 82 (1940). This was consistent with the structure of the Federal
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other "extreme" from Wigmore's proposal, his suggestion that the Evi-
dence Editorial group draft fewer rules of evidence was perceived just that
way. After Clark's plea for greater reform, the annual meeting voted first
to approve Morgan's approach rather than Wigmore's approach and later
approved Morgan's approach over Clark's suggestion. When Morgan
wrote the Foreword to the Model Code, he stated that the choice was
"between a catalogue, a creed, and a Code. The Institute decided in favor
of a Code." ''
A second draft of the Model Code of Evidence was presented at the
1941 annual meeting of the ALI. Later that year, Morgan wrote four arti-
cles about the proposed Model Code for the ABA Journal."2 In the first,
published in September 1941, Morgan discussed the theory of the Model
Code. Without mentioning either Wigmore or Clark by name, Morgan
suggested that any approach other than that utilized by the Model Code
was flawed. Wigmore's approach was insufficient because it could never be
complete. Additionally, "[e]ach generalization would have to serve as the
base for an elaborate superstructure of specifications and qualifica-
tions."' 3 "To adopt such a method would be to produce a long, unwieldy
enactment which would be in effect a restatement of the law of evidence
similar to the restatements of the substantive subjects.14 On the other
hand, the Clark approach would be valuable "only in case the decision of
the trial judge is to be final and not subject to review. Otherwise each
application of the general principle to a new situation would invite ap-
peal.""15 The only reasonable approach, then, was to "draw a series of
rules in general terms covering the larger divisions and subdivisions of the
subject without attempting to frame rules of thumb for specific situations
and to make the trial judge's ruling reviewable for abuse of discretion."16
In the January 1942 issue of the ABA Journal, the first issue after the
bombing of Pearl Harbor and the entry of the United States into World
War II, Wigmore attacked the Model Code." 7 He began by lamenting
that he will be portrayed as "too conservative and unprogressive" but for-
Rules of Civil Procedure, which Clark, as Reporter to the Advisory Committee, had been
instrumental in drafting. ABA members were made aware of this difference of opinion
among Clark, Morgan, and Wigmore in the June 1940 issue of the ABA Journal, which
reported the institute's discussion of Tentative Draft No. I of te Model Code of Evidence. See
"American Law Institute Holds Eighteenth Annual Meeting," 26 A.B.A.J. 476 (1940).
111. See Morgan, Foreword at 13.
112. All had the same title. Edmund M. Morgan, "The Code of Evidence Proposed by
the American Law Institute," 27 A.B.A.J. 539 (Sept. 1941); 27 A.B.A.J. 587 (Oct. 1941); 27
A.B.A.). 694 (Nov. 1941); 27 A.B.A.J. 742 (Dec. 1941).
113. Morgan, 27 AB.A.J. at 541.
114. Id. In his Foreword to the Model Code of Evidence (at 12), published in fall 1942,
Morgan added: "It would give the restatement a legislative form, make it rigid and hamper
the normal growth of the law."
115. Morgan, 27 A.B.A.). at 541.
116. Id.
117. See Wigmore, 28 A.B.A.). (cited in note 49).
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merly had been "reproached" as "too radical, too advanced."'" 8 He then
noted that while he was the draftsman of a competing Code of Evidence,
he had thought about the style of the Model Code for the three years of its
drafting and had not changed his mind. Limiting himself "to the defects
in method and style of the Draft as a legislative measure," '"19 Wigmore then
returned to the Evidence Editorial group's failure to follow his six Postu-
lates. The battle Wigmore lost at the 1940 ALI annual meeting was re-
newed in his January 1942 ABA Journal article.
The ALl approved the Model Code of Evidence at its May 1942 an-
nual meeting, and ABA members were informed of this in the June 1942
issue of the ABA Journal.20 By this time, however, the Journal was more
concerned with the ongoing war effort than with anything else, and the
next mention of the ALI's Model Code of Evidence was a short report in
the November 1942 issue of the Journal.
In mid-1943, the ABA's House of Delegates directed the Committee
on Jurisprudence and Law Reform to study the Model Code, Wigmore's
Code of Evidence, and other writings to aid in the reform of the law of
evidence in federal courts.'2 ' Later that year a Special Committee of the
American Bar Association on Improving the Administration of Justice rec-
ommended to state committees that they study the Model Code of Evi-
dence with a view toward adopting it. 22  Both the Texas 12 3 and
Alabama 2 4 bar associations discussed the Model Code during 1943. In
late 1944 the ABA's Committee on Jurisprudence and Law Reform recom-
mended the Model Code to the Supreme Court's Advisory Committee on
Rules of Civil and Criminal Procedure in preference to Wigmore's Code.
This recommendation was adopted by the ABA's House of Delegates. 25
In June 1944, however, a Committee on Administration of Justice on
Model Code of Evidence of the State Bar of California excoriated the the-
ory, assumptions, and form of the Model Code. Citing Wigmore's January
1942 ABA Journal article, the committee concluded that the Model Code
"was designed, not to offer any improvement to existing statutes or ex-
118. Id. at 23.
119. Id. (emphasis in original).
120. "Sessions of American Law Institute," 28 A.B.A.J. 401 (1942).
121. 68 A.B.A. Rep. 146 (1943).
122. See "Spotlight on Evidence," 27 J. Am. Jud. Soc'y 113, 115 (1943). The ALI's
official position was that it did not "urge the immediate recommendation of the Code as a
whole by a bar association or its adoption by a legislature or a court. Rather, it submits the
work to the legal profession of the country, on its merits, for such action as the bench and
bar feel prepared to take after the work has become known." Id. at 113.
123. University of Texas Professor Charles T. McCormick, a member of the Evidence
Editorial group, coordinated the discussion of the Model Code of Evidence at the 1943
Texas State Bar Association meeting. Id. at 114.
124. Id
125. 69 A.B.A. Rep. 185 (1944). The report of the Committee on Jurisprudence and
Law Reform is found at 69 A.B.A. Rep. 251.
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isting codes of evidence, but to entirely revolutionize our present rules of
evidence and td substitute for them the rules of evidence that are generally
in force in continental Europe."'12 6 The California committee attacked the
Model Code in a number of different ways. The most predictable move
was to deny that any substantial problems existed with the California rules
of evidence. The committee also claimed that the Model Code granted the
trial judge too much power at the expense of lawyers. Third, the commit-
tee argued that the Model Code created, rather than alleviated, uncer-
tainty in the law. Finally, and most curiously, it suggested that revising the
rules of evidence during a time of war misdirected American energy. A
small notice that the State Bar of California had rejected the Model Code
appeared in the December 1944 issue of the ABA Journal.12 7 After the
rejection of the Model Code by the State Bar of California, there was little
continued support from the organized bar for the adoption of the Model
Code.128
The reasons for the failure of the Model Code include Wigmore's
preemptive strike, the California State Bar's reaction to the Model Code,
and the perception that the institute and its Evidence Editorial group were
part of an elitist Eastern establishment attempting to impose their theories
on trial lawyers nationwide. 2 9
Just as important, in my view, were Morgan's explicit disavowal of
truth as the goal of the American system of adjudication and his acknowl-
edgment that the Model Code was an effort to "radically reform" the rules
of evidence by giving the trial judge greater discretion to admit and ex-
clude evidence.
In addition to their disagreement concerning the structure of the
Model Code, Wigmore and Morgan disagreed about the goal of the trial
and the need for reform. Wigmore remained a legal progressive, while
Morgan, I believe, departed from legal progressivism in order to meet the
challenge coming from scholars associated with American legal realism.
126. "Report of Committee on Administration of Justice on Model Code of Evi-
dence," 19 J. St. B. Calif. 262 (1944). I assume that this rhetoric was an attempt to equate
the Model Code with the evil of the civil law system. The Model Code's radical reformation
of the law of evidence was not modeled on civil law, although, like civil law, it gave greater
power to the trial judge and less to the attorneys.
127. 30 A.B.A.J. 700 (1944). A number of addresses were given and articles written for
state bar associations from 1941 to 1944 by supporters of the Code and members of the-
Evidence Editorial group, but nothing was printed in the ABA Journal.
128. There is nothing in the 1945 or 1946 ABA Journals or ABA Reports on reform of
the law of evidence. In 72 A.B.A. Rep. 253 (1947), there is the following from the ABA
Committee on Improving the Administration of Justice: "The committee in Missouri is co-
operating with a committee of the Missouri Bar in its work on a new code of Evidence."
The State Bar of Missouri drafted a proposed Code based on reformation of Missouri rules
of evidence rather than on the Model Code. See Symposium, "A Code of Evidence for
Missouri," 17 U.K.C.L Rev. 1 (1949). See also "Notes and Comments on the Code of
Evidence Proposed by the Missouri Bar," 10 1. Mo. B. 177 (1954).
129. On the last point, see 21 Wright &_ Graham, Federal Practice at 5 5005.
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The notions that the discovery of truth was the goal of adjudication
and that the trial judge needed discretionary power because he was the
only disinterested expert in the courtroom were consonant with progres-
sive thought. 130 While Wigmore later qualified his support for the second
tenet, 131 he believed that the goal of the trial was the discovery of truth. 32
All previous reform efforts were premised on this belief. For example, the
Commonwealth Fund's Evidence Committee, chaired by Morgan, ex-
pressly adopted this goal in 1927. Even in the Introduction to the Model
Code, Institute Director Lewis stated that the Council had rejected a re-
statement of the Law of evidence because "the rules themselves in numer-
ous and important instances are so defective that instead of being the
means of developing truth, they operate to suppress it."'' 33 Absent this
goal, the "Anglo-American" system of adjudication was not rational. Less
than 15 years after the Commonwealth Fund's report, Morgan's view, set
forth in the ABA Journal, was, "A lawsuit is not a means of making a
scientific investigation for the ascertainment of truth; it is a proceeding for
the orderly settlement of a controversy between litigants."' 34 In his Fore-
word to the Model Code of Evidence, Morgan wrote,
The court is not a scientific body. It is composed of one or more
persons skilled in the law, skilled in the general art of investigation,
but not necessarily skilled in the field which the dispute concerns,
acting either alone or with a body of men not necessarily trained in
investigation of any kind. Its final determination is binding only be-
tween the parties and their privies. It does not pronounce upon the
facts for any purpose other than the adjustment of the controversy
before it. Consequently there must be a recognition at the outset
that nicely accurate results cannot be expected; that society and the
litigants must be content with a rather rough approximation of what
a scientist might demand. 35
130. See Morgan, Law of Evidence 66-68 (cited in note 48).
131. See Wigmore, 22 A.B.A.J. at 24 (cited in note 49). Compare Wigmore, "Preface,"
in Wigmore, Code 2d at xiii (cited in note 101) (suggesting that particular rules would be
guides, not chains, thus giving the trial court greater authority to decide evidentiary issues
without fear of appellate reversal).
132. Id. "What the law of Evidence, and of Procedure, nowadays most needs is that
the men who are our judges and our lawyers shall firmly dispose themselves to get at the
truth and the merits of the case before them."
133. Lewis, "Introduction" at viii (cited in note 98).
134. Morgan, 27 A.B.A.). at 539 (cited in note 112). This is repeated in essence in
Morgan, Foreword at 3 (cited in note 109). This view is foreshadowed in a 1936 book
review, in which Morgan suggested that the book be read by no one interested in believing
"that a law suit is a proceeding for the discovery of truth by rational processes." Edmund
M. Morgan, Book Review, 49 Haw. L Rev. 1387, 1389 (1936), reviewing Irving Goldstein,
Trial Technique (1935). See also Edmund M. Morgan, "Hearsay Dangers and the Applica-
tion of the Hearsay Concept," 62 Harv. L Rev. 177, 184 (1948).
135. Morgan, Foreword at 3-4. A similar statement is made in Morgan, 27 A.B.A.J. at
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However, according to Morgan, this did not make the rules of evi-
dence irrational. Indeed, acknowledging the "political"' 136 nature of dis-
pute resolution would assist in eliminating the artificial barriers which
interfere with the ordinary, daily decision-making processes of persons.
The dispute resolution function of the courts was a middle ground be-
tween the "truth" theory of Wigmore and those who concluded that the
trial was irrational. 37 To Wigmore, of course, this was heresy. The com-
mittee of the California State Bar seemed unable to accept Morgan's state-
ments at face value, for in "praising" the motives of the Evidence Editorial
group, it stated, "We believe they feel, as we do, that.., a trial should be
conducted for the purpose of ascertaining the truth."'' 3 8 The predominant
view remained that the adversary system of adjudication was designed to
find the truth. In a 1948 book on the meaning of the Sacco and Vanzetti
case, Morgan again disparaged the assumption that in the adversary system
"the truth will emerge to the view of the impartial tribunal."' 39 These
arguments, however, remained unappealing both to legal progressives and
the larger legal profession.
A third difference between Wigmore and Morgan was that Wigmore's
conservatism in regard to the legal profession and in regard to the com-
mon law of evidence made anathema Morgan's statement that "[ilt is time,
too, for radical reformation of the law of evidence."' 40 Wigmore contin-
ued to believe, "[o]ur system of Evidence is sound on the whole."''41 He
further believed that reform efforts needed to be modest in order to suc-
ceed. 142 Although his influence on the ALI's Evidence Editorial group was
136. 21 Wright & Graham, Federal Practice at S 5005 n.45. See also Leon Green, Judge
and Jury 376 (Kansas City, Mo.: Vernon Law Book Co., 1930) (concluding that judicial
approval of the jury trial was based on its "prime political function" of absorbing citizen
discontent with verdicts). A similar statement by legal process scholars Henry Hart and
John McNaughton is found in "Evidence and Inference in the Law," 87 Daedalus 40, 44
(1958) ("Hart & McNaughton, 'Evidence and Inference' "): "A contested lawsuit is soci-
ety's last line of defense in the indispensable effort to secure the peaceful settlement of social
conflicts."
137. See text accompanying notes 162-64. See also Morgan, 27 A.B.A.J. at 541 (dis-
paraging the view "that the trial is to be a battle between the great champions of the con-
tending parties; a battle of wits between their lawyers with the judge as umpire and the jury
making the decision without advice from the judge").
138. 19 J. St. B. Calif at 281 (cited in note 126).
139. G. Louis Joughin & Edmund M. Morgan, The Legacy of Sacco and Vanzetti 184
(New York: Harcourt, Brace & Co., 1948) ("Joughin & Morgan, Sacco and Vanzetti"). Ac-
cording to the Preface, Morgan was the sole author of the chapters concerning the law of
the Sacco and Vanzetti case. Id. at v-vi.
140. Morgan, 27 A.B.A.). at 540; Morgan, Foreword at 6.
141. 1 Wigmore, Treatise at 5 8c (3d ed. 1940) (cited in note 13). See also "Report on
Improvements" at 576 (cited in note 91) ("All will agree that the body of the rules of evi-
dence, in their skeleton framework, are wise and wholesome; in short, they are a valuable
and unique contribution to the world's expedients in the investigation of truth").
142. "Report on Improvements" at 572 ("So in any proposed improvement of a rule of
law, it is wise at the same time to take measures to insure a suitable environment and admin-
istration. Any proposed improvement in the rules of evidence must heed the same warn-
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limited, to the legal profession Wigmore remained the preeminent author-
ity on the law of evidence.
Professors Wright and Graham suggest that while Morgan was not a
heretic, he rejected the more extreme views of legal progressivism. 143 My
thesis is slightly different: Because of the intellectual conflagration caused
by the rise of American legal realism in the 1920s and 1930s, Morgan
believed it necessary to destroy legal progressivism in order to save it.
F. American Legal Realism and Attacks on Reform
American legal realism 144 styled itself as a methodology growing out of
the insights of sociological jurisprudence. 45 It differed from legal progres-
sivism in two ways. First, in crude, undifferentiated terms, the horrors of
World War I led many intellectuals to disparage any proclaimed connec-
tion between morality and law, and the optimism of pre-World War I
progressives became the cynicism of postwar realists. Second, realists were
much more critical about the decision-making processes of judges. 146
The conflict became apparent in an exchange in the Harvard Law
Review in 1931. In a Harvard Law Review tribute in honor of the 90th
birthday of Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., Pound wrote an article enti-
tled "The Call for a Realistic Jurisprudence."' 47 Columbia Law School
ing"); see also Twining, Theories of Evidence 161 (cited in note 4) ("Wigmore's assumption
[was] that the law of evidence is par excellence 'lawyer's law.' Wigmore was only mildly
critical of surviving evidence doctrine. A general simplification and the abolition of a few
archaic survivals would be welcome, but on the whole there was no need for radical reform"
(footnotes omitted)).
143. 21 Wright & Graham, Federal Practice at S 5005 n.45.
144. Some secondary studies about legal realism not elsewhere cited in this article in-
clude Grant Gilmore, "Legal Realism: Its Cause and Cure," 70 Yale LJ. 1037 (1961); id,
The Death of Contract (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1974); Wilfrid E. Rumble,
Jr., American Legal Realism (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1968); Thomas W. Bech-
tier, ed., American Legal Realism Reevaluated in Law in a Social Context: Liber Amicorum
Honouring Professor Lon L Fuller I (Dordrecht, The Netherlands: Kluwer, 1978); and Robert
Summers, Instrumentalism and American Legal Theory (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press,
1982). See generally Joseph William Singer, "Legal Realism Now," 76 Calif. L Rev. 465, 476
n. 40 (1988) (listing primary and secondary sources regarding American legal realism).
145. See Karl Llewellyn, "A Realistic Jurisprudence-The Next Step," 30 Colum. L
Rev. 431 (1930).
146. In addition, through its reliance on the learning in psychology, sociology, as well
as non-Euclidean geometry, see Purcell, Crisis of Democratic Theory 74-94 (cited in note 14),
realism also suggested an empirical advance over the primitive empiricism of sociological
jurisprudence. The empirical "advances" made by the realists are extremely well depicted by
Professor John Henry Schlegel. See his "American Legal Realism and Empirical Social Sci-
ence: From the Yale Experience," 28 Buffalo L Rev. 459 (1979); id., "American Legal Real-
ism and Empirical Social Science: The Singular Case of Underhill Moore," 29 Buffalo L
Rev. 195 (1980).
147. Roscoe Pound, "The Call for a Realistic Jurisprudence," 44 Harv. L Rev. 697
(1931).
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Professor Karl Llewellyn 148 believed that Pound's article was directed at an
article he had written the previous year in the Columbia Law Review. 149
Llewellyn responded to Pound by suggesting that one of the differences
between realism and sociological jurisprudence was "[tihe temporary di-
vorce of Is and Ought"150 in the study of law in action. There were two
strains of realist thought regarding the is/ought distinction, and two re-
sponses. Llewellyn years later argued that he was not necessarily suggesting
that there were no absolute moral values;1 51 instead, he was simply con-
cerned with empirically evaluating and understanding law in American so-
ciety in light of his confession that such values did not inexorably lead to
deductions which answered specific questions of law. Others denominated
as realists, however, were convinced that values were simply subjective
preferences. For example, in a 1933 review of a book by Felix Cohen,
Yale Law School Professor Walter Nelles wrote, "I deny ethical right and
ought without qualification."' 5 2 Yale Law School Professors Thurman Ar-
nold and Edward Robinson wrote companion books published in 1935
which seemed premised on the belief that there were no moral
absolutes. 153
The response was twofold. Pound and Felix Frankfurter at Harvard
Law School responded to the realist charge by refusing to acknowledge or
148. Llewellyn granted from Yale Law School in 1918 at the top of his class. He was
the editor-in-chief of the Yale Law Journal and stayed a year after graduating to ensure the
journal's continued publication. After working for National City Bank (the predecessor of
Citicorp) and the law firm of Shearman & Sterling, he began teaching at Yale in 1922.
Llewellyn became a professor at Columbia in 1925 and stayed there until 1951, when he
began teaching at the University of Chicago law school. He died in 1962. Llewellyn was
influenced by his teachers Arthur Corbin and Wesley Hohfeld, who were intellectual par-
ents to legal realism. A biography of the work of Llewellyn is William Twining, Karl Llewel-
lyn and the Realist Movement (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1973; reprinted 1985)
("Twining, Karl Llewellyn").
149. Llewellyn, 30 Colum. L Rev. For a revised history of the Pound-Llewellyn debate,
see N. E. H. Hull, "Some Realism about the Llewellyn-Pound Exchange over Realism: The
Newly Uncovered Private Correspondence," 1987 Wis. L Rev. 921.
150. Karl Llewellyn, "Some Realism about Realism-Responding to Dean Pound," 44
Haw. L Rev. 1222, 1236 (1931) (emphasis in original).
151. Karl Llewellyn, "On the Good, the True, the Beautiful, in Law," 9 U. Chi. L Rev.
224, 264 (1942). Twining, Karl Llewellyn 123-24, calls Llewellyn a moral relativist, albeit one
who searched for absolute values. See also Elizabeth Mensch & Alan Freeman, "The Poli-
tics of Virtue: Animals, Theology and Abortion," 25 Ga. L Rev. 923, 991-92 n.222 (1991)
(quoting Llewellyn, Position Re: Religion (1943), in which Llewellyn discusses his emerging
religiousness).
152. Walter Nelles, Book Review, 33 Colurn. L Rev. 763, 767 (1933), reviewing Felix
Cohen, Ethical Systems and Legal Ideals (1933) (emphasis in original), quoted in Purcell, Crisis
of Democratic Theory 91 (cited in note 14).
153. Thurman Arnold, The Symbols of Government 32-33 (New Haven, Conn.: Yale
University Press, 1935) ("Arnold, Symbols"); Edward Robinson, Law and the Lawyers 38-43,
188-91 (New York: Macmillan Co., 1935) ("Robinson, Law and Lawyers"). These two
books were the result of a seminar (locally nicknamed "The Cave of the Winds") Arnold
and Robinson taught together at Yale Law School in the early 1930s. See Arnold, Symbols v;
Robinson, Law and Lawyers vii. See generally Karl Llewellyn, Book Review, 5 Brooklyn L
Rev. 219 (1935), reviewing both books.
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accept the postulates of realist thinking. Lon Fuller, then of Duke Law
School (and later of Harvard Law School), denied in The Law in Quest of
Itself "the possibility of a rigid separation of the is and the ought."'154 Mor-
ris Cohen, a philosopher and good friend of Felix Frankfurter, complained
that the realists "do away altogether with the normative point of view in
law."' 155 The second response was that of Catholic legal academics, who
argued for a return to Thomistic natural law.
56
The second attack by the realists on sociological jurisprudence con-
cerned the nature of judicial decision making. In 1929, Federal District
Judge Joseph Hutcheson wrote that he decided cases subjectively, "more or
less offhand and by rule of thumb."'157 The next year, a practicing lawyer
named Jerome Frank wrote Law and the Modern Mind, in which he explic-
itly followed in Judge Hutcheson's footsteps. Frank asserted: "If the per-
sonality of the judge is the pivotal factor in law administration, then law
may vary with the personality of the judge who happens to pass upon any
given case."' 58 Yale Law School Professor Thurman Arnold argued in The
Symbols of Government that the notion of the rule of law was a myth.15 9 If
154. Lon L. Fuller, The Law in Quest of Itself 5 (Chicago: Foundation Press, 1940). See
also Lon L Fuller, "American Legal Realism," 82 U. Pa. L Rev. 429 (1934).
155. Morris R. Cohen, "Justice Holmes and the Nature of Law," 31 Colurm L Rev.
352, 357 (1931). See also id., Reason and Nature bk. III, ch. 4 (1931), excerpted in Morris R.
Cohen & Felix S. Cohen, Readings in Jurisprudence and Legal Philosophy 615, 621 (1st ed.
1951):
The essence of all doctrines of natural law is the appeal from positive law to justice,
from the law that is to the law which ought to be; and unless we are ready to assert that
the concept of a law that ought to be is for some reason an inadmissible one, the roots
of natural law remain untouched. Now, it is true that the issue has seldom been so
sharply put, for to do so is to espouse an amount of dualism between the is and the
ought which is shocking to the philosophically respectable .... There have not, of
course, been wanting intellectual radicals who, in the interests of a strident monism
have clearly and conscientiously attempted to eliminate the chasm between the ought
and the is, either by denying the former, or by trying to reduce it to a species of the
latter." (Notes omitted)
On Morris Cohen and legal thought, see David Hollinger, Morris R. Cohen and the Scientyc
Ideal 165-99 (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1975).
156. See Purcell, Crisis of Democratic Theory 164-72 (cited in note 14). The Catholic
response was more fully developed after World War II. See Mensch & Freeman, 25 Ga. L
Rev. at 963-85 (discussing the creation and development of the legal journal Natural Law
Forum (now American Journal of Jurisprudence)).
157. Joseph Hutcheson, "The Judgment Intuitive: The Function of the 'Hunch' in
Judicial Decision," 14 Cornell L Q. 274 (1929). At the beginning of the decade, New York
Court of Appeals Justice Benjamin Cardozo had shocked the legal establishment by confess-
ing in The Nature of the Judicial Process, his Storrs lectures at Yale (published by Yale Univer-
sity Press in 1921), that judges exercised discretion in deciding cases.
158. Jerome Frank, Law and the Modem Mind 111 (New York: Brentano's, 1930)
("Frank, Law and Modem Mind"). On Frank, see Robert Jerome Glennon, The Iconoclast as
Refomer: Jerome Frank's Impact on American Law (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press,
1985). See also Neil Duxbury, "Jerome Frank and the Legacy of Realism," 18 J.L & Soc'y
175 (1991).
159. Arnold, Symbols 33-37, 216-19. See also Frank, Law and Modem Mind 100-101
(criticizing the notion of judging on which the ideal of the rule of law is based).
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true, then the progressive notion of the disinterested judge would unravel,
and placing authority in the "judge-as-expert" would not consequently
lead to a more "scientific" administration of justice. It would mean the
end of our system of government according to law, not the rule of men,
something which Wigmore' 6° and Pound 61 could not countenance. More
broadly, this attack struck at the foundation of the law itself, its
rationality.
Both Arnold and Frank criticized the jury trial and the judicial pro-
cess. Arnold, who taught evidence at Yale, scoffed at the belief in the
efficacy of procedural reform in courts, 16Z and entitled a chapter of The
Symbols of Government about the civil trial system, "Trial by Combat."
Frank concluded: "The jury makes the orderly administration of justice
virtually impossible."' 63 Leon Green, who succeeded Wigmore as Dean of
the Northwestern Law School, concluded in his 1930 book Judge and Jury
that the jury trial should be abolished. 64
With the exception of Morgan's review of Edward S. Robinson's Law
and the Lawyers, 65 Morgan's response to this attack by realists was indirect.
160. See Wigmore, 28 A.B.A.J. at 24 (cited in note 49) (uncabined judicial discretion
would return us to "that primal condition of chaos").
161. See Purcell, Crisis of Democratic Theory 161-62 (cited in note 14) (discussing
Pound's reaction to the perceived excesses of realism).
162. Arnold, Symbols 129. See also id., "Trial by Combat and the New Deal," 47 Haw.
L Rev. 913 (1934) (presenting an earlier version of chapter 8 of The Symbols of Government);
id., "The Role of Substantive Law and Procedure in the Legal Process," 45 Haw. L Rev. 617
(1932) (discussing the idea of the courtroom as theater); id., Book Review, 42 Yale L.i. 459
(1933), reviewing W. P. Barrett, The Trial of Jeanne D'Arc (1932); id., Book Review, 40 Yae
Li. 833 (1931), reviewing Leon Green, Judge and Jury (1930). See also Thurman Arnold &
Fleming James, Cases on Trials Judgments and Appeals (St. Paul, Minn.: West, 1936) (a collec-
tion of cases, the purpose of which is to convince the reader that the system of trial is better
understood as concerned with rhetorical devices rather than the rational resolution of dis-
putes). Arnold's decision to part ways with Charles Clark in using data to reform the rules
of procedure is discussed in Schlegel, 28 Buffalo L Rev. at 511-12 (cited in note 146). A
sensitive description of Arnold's evolving views is Ayer, 23 Stan. L Rev. (cited in note 46).
See also Gene M. Gressley, "Introduction," in Gressley, ed., Voltaire and the Cowboy: The
Letters of Thurman Arnold (Boulder, Colo.: Colorado Associated Press, 1977). Robinson,
Law and Lawyers 32, 115, wrote only in passing about the jury trial, but in the two asides
indicated that it might be the case that the primary purpose of a jury trial was the "resolu-
tion of an emotional conflict-that it is only secondarily concerned with the fitting of the
law to the facts."
163. Frank, Law and Modern Mind 181. Frank also noted, "The decisions of many
cases are products of irresponsible jury caprice and prejudice.... [Tihat the principal wit-
ness for one of the parties is a Mason or a Catholic... such facts often determine who will
win or lose." Id. at 177-78. See also Jerome Frank, Courts on Trial (Princeton, NJ.:
Princeton University Press, 1949).
164. Leon Green, Judge and Jury 395-417 (1930). Green also complained that "[t]he
trial judges' power to deal decisively with questions of evidence has constantly dwindled."
Id. at 379. There is an elliptical suggestion in Roalfe, Wigmore 228 (cited in note 13), that
Green supported Wigmore's view regarding the ALI's Model Code of Evidence, but the
single sentence indicating support is terribly unclear.
165. Edmund M. Morgan, Book Review, 13 N.Y.U.LQ. 322 (1936), reviewing Robin-
son's Law and the Lawyers (cited in note 153). The review is written in the second person, in
which the "you" Morgan refers to throughout the review is a reference to himself. In gen-
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However, in his short two-and-a-half page review, Morgan attacked Robin-
son, a psychologist at Yale University, for his caricatured explication of
law and lawyers in the first four chapters of the book. While Morgan be-
lieved the later chapters of some value, he concluded that Robinson's
book only partially brought "the doctrines of the substantive and proce-
dural law into harmony with the approved and tested doctrines of the
social sciences." 166
By the mid-1930s, the American Law Institute had completed several
of the Restatements of the law. While the response of the legal establish-
ment was exceedingly favorable, 167 the Yale-based realists, who for the
most part were not involved in the Restatements, 168 unceasingly criticized
its purpose, assumptions, and methodology. 169 To some it likely seemed
that the realists were striking at the very heart of the legal system. For
example, Dean Herbert Goodrich of the University of Pennsylvania Law
School (and later the second director of the institute) wrote an article170
defending the Restatement project after taking umbrage at a comment
made by Robinson in Law and the Lawyers. 171 While the comment seems
today to be a sharp but not unfair comment about the methodology of the
Restatement, Goodrich considered it "fighting words, clearly passing the
eral, a search of the Index to Legal Periodicals indicates that professors at Harvard Law School
ignored books by realists. Morgan's review is one of a very few by a Harvard Law School
professor discussing a "realist" book. Since Robinson's book was the product of a seminar
taught with Arnold, and since Robinson and Arnold viewed their books as collaborative
efforts, it is curious that Morgan did not review Arnold's Symbols of Government and that he
mentioned only in passing Robinson's collaboration with Arnold. Morgan's only public
mention of Arnold is found in a speech given to the West Virginia Bar Association in 1941
concerning the Proposed Model Code of the ALl. The reference is simply a joke about
Arnold leaving West Virginia for Yale. See Edmund M. Morgan, "The Proposed Code of
Evidence," 57 Proc. W. Va. B. Ass'n 161 (1942).
166. Morgan, 13 N.Y..LQ at 324. Interestingly, Morgan took a swipe at Frank's
Law and Modem Mind in this book review.
167. See Herbert Goodrich, "Institute Bards and Yale Reviewers," 48 Yale Li. 449
(1936).
168. Yale Law School Dean Clark was a member of the Advisory Committee to the
Restatement of Property, and Professor Arthur Corbin was the Assistant Reporter to
Samuel Williston in the Restatement of Contracts. For a convincing explanation why
Corbin agreed to act as Assistant Reporter in the Restatement of Contracts, see Daniel J.
Klau, Note, "What Price Certainty? Corbin, Williston, and the Restatement of Contracts,"
70 B.U.L Rev. 511 (1990).
169. See, e.g., Thurman Arnold, "The Restatement of the Law of Trusts," 31 Colum.
L Rev. 800 (1931); Charles Clark, "The Restatement of the Law of Contracts," 42 Yale Li.
643 (1933); Thurman Arnold, "Institute Priests and Yale Observers-A Reply to Dean
Goodrich," 84 U. Pa. L Rev. 811 (1936).
170. Goodrich, 48 Yale Li.
171. Robinson wrote: "Our main interest, however, is in the general philosophy of the
[Restatement] undertaking, which is plainly founded upon the belief that too much truth
about the law is disastrously confusing and that the remedy may be found in an authorita-
tive suppression of the facts rather than in better education of the public and the bar as to
the actual psychological and sociological nature of the law." Robinson, Law and Lawyers 36
(cited in note 153). Goodrich, 48 Yale Li. at 451-52.
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limit of fair comment."1 72 Robinson's collaborator, Thurman Arnold, re-
sponded in defense of Robinson, and chastised his Harvard Law School
classmate Goodrich.173 Interestingly, in the course of his apologia, Arnold
wrote,
The most important institution wherein such conflicts are reconciled,
either by ceremony or logic, is the judicial system. It cannot, there-
fore, be a place where hard, cold truth is sought, yet it must be a place
where everyone thinks that truth is searched for. For this paradoxical
function the technique of trial by battle seems admirably fitted. Both
sides state their positions with the utmost exaggeration possible, and
the ordinary decision permits all the conflicting ideals to stand which
may be reconciled with its decision.174
The attack by the realists appeared to be an attack on both the legal pro-
fession (represented in part by the Harvard Law School professors who
worked as Reporters for the Restatements) and the ideals of legal
progressivism.
In a sense, then, as Reporter for the American Law Institute's Model
Code of Evidence, Morgan was stepping into this fray. As a Harvard-
trained lawyer and a Harvard Law School professor, Morgan was outside
the immediate intellectual home of realism. However, he had taught at
Yale from 1917 to 1925, and as an academic critical of the handling of the
Sacco-Vanzetti case, he had used his interest in law in action to demolish
the trial judge's handling of the evidence in that case. 7 5
Morgan was jurisprudentially and pedagogically different from the ar-
chetypical Harvard Law School formalist, like Samuel Williston or Joseph
Beale. In directing the Commonwealth Fund Evidence Committee's re-
port on the law of evidence, Morgan and the committee "engaged in a
primitive form of empirical research so that they could claim that their
proposals were based on 'factual material', rather than upon opinion and a
priori judgments." 76 Jerome Frank characterized Morgan in late 1948 as
"perhaps" a "fact skeptic,"' 7 7 Frank's highest compliment for any legal
172. Goodrich, 48 Yale LJ. at 452.
173. Arnold, 84 U. Pa. L Rev. 811 (1936).
174. Id. at 813.
175. See Joughin & Morgan, Sacco and Vanzetti (cited in note 139). Morgan's contri-
butions had in part been written 20 years before publication of the book. Id. at v.
176. 21 Wright & Graham, Federal Practice at § 5005.
177. Jerome Frank, Law and Modern Mind xi (Preface to 6th printing 1948) (cited in
note 158). Frank delineated two camps of "realists," a term he disparaged, rule skeptics and
fact skeptics. The other persons categorized as fact skeptics were Leon Green, Max Radin,
Thurman Arnold, and William 0. Douglas, along with himself. Id. at xii. This preface was
separately published in the Syracuse Law Review. See Jerome Frank, "Legal Thinking in
Three Dimensions," 1 Syracuse L Rev. 9, 11 (1949). See also Frank, Courts on Trial 74 (cited
in note 163). Morgan critically responded to Frank's claims about "fact skepticism" in a
review of Courts on Trial. See Morgan, Book Review, 2 J. Legal Educ. 385 (1950) ("It is
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scholar. At Harvard during the 1930s, Morgan was one of a group of "five
men who rebelled against formalism."' 178 Each tried to position himself,
both in class and in writing, between the "anarchy" of legal realism and
the "sterility" of legal formalism. Their successors, mostly trained at the
Harvard Law School, would use some of those insights to form the juris-
prudential thinking denominated reasoned elaboration, or legal process.
By 1939, when the ALl Evidence Editorial group began its work, legal
realism was portrayed as the jurisprudential equivalent to Nazism. Real-
ism's relentless positivism caused a tremendous fear in jurisprudential cir-
cles; at the same time, its messages concerning the absence of absolute
values and the subjectivity (read arbitrariness) of judicial decision making
had penetrated much of American legal thought. However, it appears that
the jurisprudential "crisis"' 179 shortly before World War II was, in part, an
intramural battle as far as the legal profession was concerned. The claims
and counterclaims made largely by several professors at Harvard and Yale
law schools had little immediate impact on the direction of the legal pro-
fession. After all, the Supreme Court had just retreated from formalism in
1937, and the American Bar Association, the only "national" association
of lawyers, was largely a reactionary organization. 80 The efforts exerted by
legal academics to attack or defend an autonomous legal order had little
apparent effect on legal practice.
Morgan's compromise between the "formalistic" catalogue suggested
by Wigmore and the "realistic" creed suggested by former Yale Law
School Dean Clark, was an attempt to find a middle way to restore law to
its relatively autonomous place in the jurisprudential firmament. The
choices made in the Model Code of Evidence reflected this middle way:
judicial power to admit or exclude evidence was not only necessary (a pro-
gressive tenet)' 8' but inevitable (a realist tenet). This power required giv-
ing the trial judge a great deal of discretion (contrary to Wigmore's view),
but discretion was cabined (contrary to realism), albeit only within some
difficult for me to see how anyone can teach a course in Evidence or in Procedure without
emphasizing the uncertainty not only in the framing and the application of the rules but
also, and especially, in the ascertainment of the facts to which the rules are to be applied").
178. Included in this group were Felix Frankfurter, James M. Landis, Thomas Reed
Powell, and George Gardner. See Kalman, Legal Realism 49 (cited in note 1). 1 would add
Professor Zechariah Chafee, an evidence, remedies, and constitutional law scholar, to that
list.
179. See Purcell, Crisis of Democratic Theory 159 (cited in note 14). Cf. Robert Gordon,
"Introduction: J. Willard Hurst and the Common Law Tradition in American Legal Histori-
ography," 10 Law & Soc'y Rev. 9, 38 n.85 (1975) (suggesting a revision of Purcell's thesis).
180. See Jerold S. Auerbach, Unequal Justice: Lawyers and Social Change in Modem
America 216 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1976) (discussing the applications to
ABA membership of three black lawyers in the early 1940s. The two who publicly chal-
lenged the discriminatory practices of the ABA were denied membership, while the third,
who remained silent, was admitted).
181. See Morgan, Foreword at 13-16 (cited in note 109).
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more general rule, with appeals available for the abuse of discretion. 8 2
While the trial was not a scientific search for the truth' 83 (contrary to pro-
gressive tenets), neither was it an irrational way of allocating rights and
responsibilities (contrary to realist tenets). The rules governing adjudica-
tion of the dispute were rational as long as "artificial barriers to logically
persuasive data be removed."' 184 This, of course, assumes that the jurors
could be logically persuaded by receiving more "relevant" data, an assump-
tion not shared by many realists. Related to this was Morgan's statement,
"A trial cannot be a purely intellectual performance."'' 8 5 The realist-based
insight that "the emotions of the persons involved-litigants, counsel, wit-
nesses, judge and jurors-will play a part"'18 6 in decision making was used
to counter the "formality" of Wigmore's approach but was adopted only
with the qualifier "purely." That is, a trial was not purely an "emotional"
performance either. 87 Finally, in drafting an evidence code, Morgan as-
sumed the competency of a judge. He did not require, as the progressives
did, an unusually expert judge, nor did he assume, as Jerome Frank did,
that the competent judge needed to make himself aware of his "own
prejudices, biases, antipathies, and the like"' 8 to somehow free himself
from those inevitable biases.
The published response in legal periodicals indicates that the legal
profession perceived Morgan's attempted reconstruction of the law of evi-
dence as part of a truly "radical" reform. The Model Code was opposed
by the legal profession for a number of reasons: (1) Wigmore's opposi-
tion; (2) greater power accorded judges (and less to advocates); (3) the
Code's disinclination to treat a trial solely as a search for truth, particu-
larly at a time when the United States was engaged in a war against the
forces of evil in a fight for freedom and justice; and (4) the admission that
a trial was not a purely intellectual (read rational) performance. 18 9 No
state adopted the Model Code of Evidence. As Morgan wrote in 1951,
"The reception which the Model Code of Evidence of the American Law
Institute has met strongly indicates that the bar at any rate is not ready for
182. Id. at 12.
183. Id. at 3.
184. Id. at 4.
185. Id.
186. Id. (emphasis added). See Frank, Law and Modern Mind.
187. A contemporary use of Morgan's distinction is found in the FRE Advisory Com-
mittee's Notes. See Advisory Committee's Note, Federal Rule of Evidence 403 (1975) (permit-
ting exclusion of relevant evidence to counter the risk of "inducing decision on a purely
emotional basis").
188. Frank, Law and Modern Mind 147 n.* (cited in note 158).
189. Wright and Graham write that the heavy concentration of "Eastern Establish-
ment" figures in the Evidence Editorial group also affected the reception of the Model Code
of Evidence. 21 Wright & Graham, Federal Practice at S 5005 ("The Code doubtlessly suf-
fered as well from the prejudice of many lawyers toward the Harvardians and Easterners who
dominated the drafting Committee").
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codification."' 190 Harkening wistfully back to the progressive notion of ex-
pertise, Morgan continued,
It might have been supposed that a proposal sponsored by a body
which is composed of representative judges, lawyers, and law teachers
would meet with general approval, especially in view of the standing
of the lawyers and judges who compose its Council, and who are re-
sponsible for proposals put to the Assembly, and whose work is sub-
ject to veto by the Assembly. 191
It is likely that Morgan and many members of the legal profession differed
regarding their understanding that either the Evidence Editorial group or
the Assembly of the American Law Institute was "representative" of the
legal profession.
Morgan continued to believe in the efficacy of reform. Following in
Pound's footsteps, Morgan implored the profession to abolish those rules
"designed to make the lawsuit a contest of skill instead of a rational inves-
tigation."'192 Morgan made one final argument for granting more discre-
tion to trial judges, calling the judge "[tihe only impartial official dealing
with the jury."193 Morgan cautioned that resistance to reform would result
in a continued increase in the power of nonexpert administrative agen-
cies. 194 His concluding paragraph was a plea for the Advisory Committee
to the Supreme Court to treat the law of evidence as it had treated the law
of civil procedure. 195
G. Uniform Rules of Evidence
In 1948, the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform
State Laws (NCCUSL) decided that the law of evidence was a proper sub-
ject for uniformity among the states. The next year the ALl referred the
Model Code of Evidence to the NCCUSL for study "and if deemed desira-
ble for redrafting."' 196 The NCCUSL decided that the Model Code would
provide the basis for their work. After some discussion with the ALl, the
Uniform Rules were drafted independently. 197 A committee consisting of
190. Morgan, 29 Tex. L Rev. 587, 598 (cited in note 47).
191. Id.
192. Id. at 599.
193. Id. at 604.
194. Id at 607-9. This flipped the progressive notion of expert bureaucratic control
and played well with lawyers, concerned as always about the extraordinary discretion given
administrative judges and officials.
195. Id. at 610.
196. "Prefatory Note," in National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State
Laws, Uniform Rules of Evidence 161 (1953) ("Prefatory Note").
197. Id.
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some of the same members of the Evidence Editorial group of the institute,
as well as some practicing lawyers from southern and midwestern states,
was chosen in 1949.198 The NCCUSL unanimously passed the Uniform
Rules of Evidence in 1953. Shortly thereafter, the ABA adopted the Uni-
form Rules of Evidence.1 99 The goal of the NCCUSL was and is uniform-
ity; therefore, compared with the Model Code of Evidence, efforts at
reform were limited. "So with the objects of acceptability and uniformity
in mind, this effort is devoted to the policy of retaining such parts of the
Model Code as appear to meet the requirements of such objectives, and to
reject, revise or modify the rest. ' '2 00 The NCCUSL evidence committee
followed the general form of the Model Code201 and, with the elimination
of several "procedural" rules, succeeded in reducing the number of rules
to 72. The complete edition of the Uniform Rules of Evidence had a mere
57 pages.
While legal academics largely supported adoption of the Uniform
Rules of Evidence, Supreme Court inaction quickly dissipated any momen-
tum for states to adopt the Rules.202 Because the Rules were drafted less to
reform the law of evidence than to make it uniform, the only argument in
favor of adoption was that the law of evidence would be the same in all the
states. Since most lawyers were limited by attorney licensure laws and the
economics of practice to one state, and since any change meant learning
new and different rules of evidence, this argument was unpersuasive.
While a few states did adopt the Uniform Rules of Evidence, 20 3 commenta-
198. By the end of the drafting of the Uniform Rules, the committee was composed of
Spencer A. Gard, a judge from Kansas; Mason Ladd, a professor at the University of Iowa
who had been a member of the committee which prepared the Model Code; Charles T.
McCormick of the University of Texas, also a member of the Model Code Committee;
Lucian Morehead, a practitioner from Texas; Maynard Pirsig, a professor at the University
of Minnesota; John Pryor, a practitioner in Iowa; Robert Woodside, Pennsylvania Attorney
General; and Joe Estes, a Dallas, Texas, lawyer. Earlier in the drafting process, practitioners
from New Jersey, Delaware, and Florida had been members of the committee.
199. "Prefatory Note" at 162. The ALl approved the Uniform Rules of Evidence at its
1954 annual meeting. 31 ALl Proc. 44 (1954). Morgan supported approval by the ALI. 31
ALI Proc. 36, 41.
200. "Prefatory Note" at 161. See also Spencer A. Gard, "The Uniform Rules of Evi-
dence," 31 Tulane L Rev. 19, 23 (1956) ("Sensible change without shock is an underlying
policy of the Rules. That is the reason why the Rules take a somewhat conservative ap-
proach to the problem of hearsay").
201. "Also, the general policy of the draftsmen for the Model Code in covering the
matter in the form of rather broad general rules has been adopted, in preference to a policy
of voluminous detail." "Prefatory Note" at 162.
202. In 1957, Charles Joiner sketched the history of the Federal Rules Advisory Com-
mittee's treatment or rather, lack of treatment, of the law of evidence, from the 1930s to
1956. He noted that the Advisory Committee evinced no interest in drafting rules of evi-
dence, and that the Supreme Court had discharged the Advisory Committee in 1956.
Joiner suggested to the Judicial Conference the study and adoption of uniform rules of evi-
dence in the federal courts. Charles Joiner, "Uniform Rules of Evidence for the Federal
Courts," 20 F.R.D. 429, 429-31 (1957).
203. Kansas, New Jersey, and Utah adopted versions of the Uniform Rules of Evi-
dence, as did the Virgin Islands. The relationship between California's evidence code and
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tors suggested that true reform required the passage of uniform rules of
evidence in the federal courts.2 °4
The theory of the Uniform Rules of Evidence was similar to the
Model Code of Evidence: more authority should be placed in the hands of
the trial judge and less in the hands of opposing counsel; a judge must be
given discretion to make "judgment calls"; this discretion is subject to ap-
pellate reversal for abuse; and the rules of evidence must be rewritten to
make the investigation of the events at issue more rational. But, unlike
Morgan, the Conference Committee downplayed any suggestions that the
trial was not a search for truth, and, as mentioned above, claimed that the
Uniform Rules were a modest reform, not a radical reformation of the law
of evidence.
H. Reasoned Elaboration
The theory granting the trial court discretion to make evidentiary rul-
ings, viewed as "radical" only a decade before, fit snugly within the domi-
nant form of legal thought in the post-World War II era: reasoned
elaboration. 20 5 According to Harvard Law School Professors Henry Hart
and Albert Sacks, "the power of reasoned elaboration" meant "two princi-
pal things. 20 6 "It means, first of all, that the magistrate is obliged to re-
solve the issue before him on the assumption that the answer will be the
same in all like cases." 20 7 "Secondly, the magistrate is obliged to relate his
decision in some reasoned fashion to the... statute out of which the issue
arises. '208 Of course, Hart and Sacks acknowledged, this involved the ex-
the Uniform Rules is quite confused. See Kenneth W. Graham, Jr., "California's 'Restate-
ment' of Evidence: Some Reflections on Appellate Repair of the Codification Fiasco," 4
Loy. LAL Rev. 279, 279 (1971) ("After studying the problem for nearly a decade the Com-
mission came to the conclusion that what California needed was not the Uniform Rules but
a Restatement of California Evidence").
204. See Joiner, 20 F.R.D. at 439.
205. See Henry M. Hart & Albert M. Sacks, The Legal Process: Basic Problems in the
Making and Application of Law 161 (tent. ed. Cambridge, Mass.: private printing, 1958)
("Hart & Sacks, The Legal Process"). Two studies of reasoned elaboration are White, 59 Va.
L Rev. (cited in note 14), and Gary Peller, "Neutral Principles in the 1950s," 21 U. Mich.
J.L Reform 556 (1989).
206. Hart & Sacks, The Legal Process 161.
207. Id.
208. Id. See Morgan, 13 N.Y.U.LQ. at 323. In reviewing Robinson's book, Morgan
noted, "He does not disguise the fact that a court must not only be able to come to what it
regards as a righteous decision but must also be able to produce a respectable opinion in
support of it." This fits within reasoned elaboration in two respects: First, passive language
that a court must "come to what it regards as a righteous decision" implicitly assumes that
an inquiry whether the decision was "right" is either unanswerable or unimportant. Sec-
ond, the center of reasoned elaboration was whether the court supported its decision by
principled reasoning in its opinion. See also Hart & McNaughton, "Evidence and Infer-
ence" at 45 (cited in note 136) ("While it is of course important that the court be right in its
determinations of fact, it is also important that the court decide the case when the parties
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ercise of discretion, but the constraints of reasoned elaboration permitted
a middle way between "the rigors of a perfected rule, on the one hand, and
the looseness of unbuttoned discretion, on the other." 20 9
Reasoned elaboration grew out of the response to American legal real-
ism. As earlier suggested, the two most alarming conclusions of the realists
were, first, the subjectivity of moral values and, second, the political or
nonlegal nature of judging. The rise in the 1930s of the Nazis in Germany
and the Fascists in Italy, as well as the continued aggression of Japan in
East Asia, led some academics to equate legal realism with totalitarianism.
The first effort in jurisprudence, then, was to attempt to repair the notion
of a "fit" between law and morality. The second effort, begun in part by
Morgan in the Model Code of Evidence, was to re-separate law from
politics.
The pre-World War II "anti-formalists 210 at Harvard Law School, in
particular Frankfurter, T. R. Powell, James Landis, and Morgan, wrote and
taught that judicial behavior influenced law. However, that behavior did
not necessarily lead to the conclusion that law was politics by another
name. Instead, this simply meant that a closer examination of judicial de-
cision making, particularly in public law, was necessary. This view was best
stated by Powell, discussing the teaching of constitutional law: "My em-
phasis is on process, process, process, on particularities, particularities, on
cases, cases, cases, on the contemporary court, on resolving competing
considerations, on watching for practicalities not likely to be expressed in
opinions in which the court pretends that the case is being decided by its
predecessor rather than by itself."21'
The emphasis on process by Powell, among others at Harvard Law
School, was an attempt to reinvigorate the autonomy of law. Frankfurter
and Landis's landmark study, The Business of the Supreme Court, while con-
cluding that the issues of federal procedure often involved political and
cultural battles, suggested that the Court be granted the authority to con-
trol procedure because it was "technical and non-partisan." 212 The realist
conclusion that political battles recurred throughout all of law was never
adopted by the Harvard antiformalists. Instead, a better understanding of
and appreciation for the institutional and doctrinal constraints in the judi-
cial process was needed. Academics were doctrinal experts who could pro-
vide that appreciation to judges who had strayed. Therefore, law
ask for the decision and on the basis of the evidence presented. A decision must be made
now, one way or the other").
209. Hart & Sacks, The Legal Process 162.
210. See Kalman, Legal Realism 49 (cited in note 1). See note 178.
211. Id. at 51 (quoting an undated memorandum from Powell).
212. Felix Frankfurter & James Landis, The Business of the Supreme Court 243 (New
York: Macmillan Co., 1928). "The story of these momentous political and economic issues
lies concealed beneath the surface technicalities governing the jurisdiction of the Federal
Courts." Id. at vii.
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professors were in the best position to assist judges to better shape the
legal system and the legal profession.21 3
Frankfurter left Harvard to become an Associate Justice of the
Supreme Court in 1939. Landis spent several years in the 1930s in Wash-
ington as a New Deal administrator.21 4 Their departures, however, did not
markedly affect the development of reasoned elaboration at Harvard Law
School after World War II. The dean at Harvard from 1946 to 1947, Er-
win Griswold, received his legal education at Harvard in the late 1920s.
Lon Fuller, a trenchant critic of realism and later exponent of legal process
theory,215 was named to the Harvard Law School faculty in 1940. Henry
Hart, a 1930 Harvard Law School graduate and president of the Harvard
Law Review, was appointed to the faculty in 1932. Albert Sacks graduated
from Harvard in 1948, and in 1952, after practicing law and working as a
judicial clerk for Justice Frankfurter, was appointed to the Harvard Law
School faculty.
Reasoned elaboration attempted to demonstrate that institutional
structures and procedural constraints could reintegrate the "is/ought" dis-
tinction;21 6 it also attempted to return the judge to the status of compe-
tent, impartial magistrate. 217 Supporters of reasoned elaboration "solved"
the "is/ought" problem by resort to process. This avoided dealing with
notions of moral "right" or the problem of the subjectivity of values.
Whether the substantive law was right was not the focus of reasoned
elaboration. 1 8
At the same time that reasoned elaboration became the dominant
mode of legal thought, the American Law Institute began the Second Re-
statement. In its Annual Report for 1953, the institute indicated a need for
a Second Restatement of the law, to ensure that the Restatements contin-
ued accurately to reflect the law.219 In 1958, ALl director Goodrich as-
serted that little had changed in the rules or principles since the First
Restatement.220 Drafting a Second Restatement to keep up with the law
213. See Alexander Bickel, The Least Dangerous Branch 25-26 (paper; 2d ed. New Ha-
ven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1986) ("Judges have, or should have, the leisure, the
training, and the insulation to follow the ways of the scholar in pursuing the ends of
government").
214. Sutherland, The Law at Harvard 302 (cited in note 55). On Landis, see Donald R.
Ritchie, James M. Landis: Dean of the Regulators (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University
Press, 1980).
215. See Lon L. Fuller, The Morality of Law (2d ed. New Haven, Conn.: Yale Univer-
sity Press, 1969).
216. See Hart & Sacks, The Legal Process 4-5 (cited in note 205).
217. Id. at 161-79.
218. See Amar, 102 Haw. L Rev. at 691 (cited in note 14). See also Philip Bobbitt,
Constitutional Fate 43 (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1982) ("It's not whatjudges do, Hart told us, it's how they do it"; emphasis in original). Hart & McNaughton,
"Evidence and Inference" at 145 (cited in note 136).
219. American Law Institute, Annual Report 7 (1953).
220. Herbert Goodrich, Introduction, Restatement (Second) of Agency vii (St. Paul,
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contradicted Goodrich's statement, for the conclusion that the law could
vary from the principles of the Restatements was contrary to the assump-
tion of the First Restatement that they were needed to create certainty and
uniformity. The Second Restatement was necessary in part because the
law could never be certain nor uniform. It was also necessary because a
Second Restatement could be used as a bridge between "formalists" un-
willing to alter the law and "realists" interested in "radical" reformation of
the law. The Second Restatement would moderate any reforms, given the
instrumental assumption that law changed as society changed.22' From
Judge Goodrich the directorship of the institute passed in 1962 to Herbert
Wechsler.
The two most important texts of reasoned elaboration were Hart and
Sacks's The Legal Process: Basic Problems in the Making and Application of
Law 2Z2 and Hart and Wechsler's The Federal Courts and the Federal Sys-
tem.2 23 Henry Hart and Herbert Wechsler were the dominant forces in
reasoned elaboration. Wechsler, who had no formal connection with
Harvard Law School (he received his law degree from and taught at Co-
lumbia Law School), also wrote the most important law review article ex-
ploring the compatibility of reasoned elaboration and issues of social
justice.224 After Wechsler became director of the institute, the Second Re-
statements were used explicitly as part of reasoned elaboration to show
changes in policy. In discussing the differences between the First and Sec-
ond Restatement of Conflicts, Wechsler stated:
It is a treatment that takes full account of the enormous change in
dominant judicial thought respecting conflicts problems that has
taken place in relatively recent years. The essence of that change has
been the jettisoning of a multiplicity of rigid rules in favor of stan-
dards of greater flexibility, according sensitivity in judgment to impor-
tant values that were formerly ignored. Such a transformation in the
corpus of the law reduces certitude as well as certainty, posing a spe-
cial problem in the process of restatement. Its solution lies in candid
recognition that black-letter formulation must often consist of open-
ended standards, gaining further content from reasoned elaboration
in the comments and specific instances of application there or in the
notes of the Reporter. That technique is not unique to Conflicts but
Minn.: American Law Institute Pubs., 1959) ("Few of the rules laid down in the first edition
have been changed"). The Introduction itself was dated 11 April 1958.
221. See also Grant Gilmore, The Ages of American Law 83-86 (New Haven, Conn.:
Yale University Press, 1977) ("Gilmore, Ages of American Law") (discussing the joint work of
the ALI and the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws supporting
the drafting of the Uniform Commercial Code and its "conservative" nature).
222. Hart & Sacks, The Legal Process.
223. Henry M. Hart & Herbert Wechsler, The Federal Courts and the Federal System
(Westbury, Conn.: Foundation Press, 1953).
224. See Herbert Wechsler, "Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law," 73
Harv. L Rev. 1 (1959).
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the situation here has called for its employment quite pervasively
throughout these volumes. The result presents a striking contrast to
the first Restatement in which dogma was so thoroughly en-
shrined.225
Reasoned elaboration was the heir to progressive proceduralism.
With the notable exception of Wechsler, it was largely Harvard law profes-
sors and Harvard-trained lawyers who used the jurisprudential insights of
reasoned elaboration to ward off (Yale-based) realism. This successor to
progressive proceduralism permitted them to do so without retreating
either to formalism or to natural law. Reasoned elaboration returned the
judge to a position of impartiality and defended the rationality of law. The
training and shaping of judges by expert academics, as well as informed
critique of judges by academics, would ensure the competence of judges.
The judge remained a (the only) disinterested person at the trial, and the
acknowledgment of judicial discretion did not invite the judge to substi-
tute his personal views as "legal" views, for the institutional and profession
constraints imposed on the judge by the structure of the legal system lim-
ited his discretion. Additionally, advocates of reasoned elaboration af-
firmed the need for judicial discretion: "Discretion is a vehicle of good far
more than of evil. It is the only means by which the intelligence and good
will of a society can be brought to bear directly upon the solution of hith-
erto unsolved problems." 2 6 Explicit balancing of individual and state in-
terests by a competent, disinterested judge was in the best tradition of
common law (and constitutional law) adjudication.
Part of the difficulty of categorizing jurisprudential "movements" and
accounting for their effects is the lag of time.227 While it may be true that
reasoned elaboration ran aground as a jurisprudential theory when its pro-
ponents decided that Brown v. Board of Education228 was an "unprincipled"
decision,22 9 reasoned elaboration continued to be taught and was the dom-
225. Herbert Wechsler, Introduction, Restatement (Second) of Conflicts vii (St. Paul,
Minn.: American Law Institute Pubs., 1971).
226. Hart & Sacks, The Legal Process 179 (cited in note 205).
227. For example, former Harvard University history professor Alan Brinkley, now at
Columbia University, wrote a review of the 1988 Presidential campaign. Alan Brinkley, "A
Savage and Demeaning Ritual," N.Y Times Bk. Rev., 14 Oct. 1990, at 1, col. 1, reviewing
Sidney Blumenthal, Pledging Allegiance (1990). In the review, Brinkley suggests that Michael
Dukakis's "image of public life reflected the value-neutral credo of Harvard University's
Kennedy School of Government, where he taught for several years between his first and
second terms as Governor of Massachusetts." Id at 28. Since Dukakis was a 1960 graduate
of the Harvard Law School, he instead may have reflected the process-based credo of rea-
soned elaboration. My point is that jurisprudential movements often are implemented after
some delay. For example, since the Supreme Court presently consists of three 1960s gradu-
ates of the Harvard Law School, the Court eventually may attempt to revive reasoned
elaboration.
228. 374 U.S. 483 (1954).
229. See Wechsler, 73 Harv. L Rev.
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inant theory of jurisprudential discourse until the 197 0s. 230 Reasoned
elaboration was the jurisprudential basis for the structure of the Federal
Rules of Evidence.
L Federal Rules of Evidence
In March 1961, Chief Justice Earl Warren appointed a Special Advi-
sory Committee on Rules of Evidence "to study and report on the advisa-
bility of adopting a system of uniform rules of evidence in the Federal
courts. 2 31 The Special Committee concluded that rules of evidence were
procedural, that a study of federal judges and some practitioners showed a
desire for uniform rules, and that the Uniform Rules of Evidence could be
used as a model.2 32 Adoption of the Special Committee's report occurred
in 1963,233 and an Advisory Committee was appointed in 1965, with Pro-
fessor Edward Cleary appointed as Reporter.234
The Advisory Committee submitted a Preliminary Draft in 1969, and
in 1970 and in 1971, further Revised Drafts were submitted. Amend-
ments to the third draft were made in 1972, and in 1973 a bill was passed
in Congress delaying the implementation of the Rules until after the ad-
journment of the first session of the 93d Congress, unless Congress first
approved them. Congressional approval finally occurred in December
1974, and the bill was signed into law by President Ford on 2 January
1975. The Federal Rules of Evidence were implemented on 1 July 1975.235
The overarching structure of the Federal Rules of Evidence, following
the path of the Model Code of Evidence, avoids the "extremes" of particu-
larity or undue generality. "Style would strike a middle course between
230. See White, 59 Va. L Rev. at 291-94 (cited in note 14). The Hart/Sacks Legal
Process teaching materials, although never published in final form, were used by many law
schools in teaching courses entitled Legal Process in the 1960s and 1970s. Further, the
Hart/Wechsler casebook on federal courts dominated that field for many years.
231. Comm. on Rules of Practice and Procedure of the Judicial Conference of the
United States, "A Preliminary Report on the Advisability and Feasibility of Developing
Uniform Rules of Evidence for the United States District Courts," 30 F.R.D. 73, 76 (1962).
232. Thomas F. Green, Jr., "Preliminary Study of the Advisability and Feasibility of
Developing Uniform Rules of Evidence for the Federal Courts," 30 F.R.D. 79, 99-105,
110-13 (1962). The report mentioned the Model Code of Evidence as "a starting point" for
the Committee which wrote the Uniform Rules of Evidence. Id. at 11. At the end of the
report, the Special Advisory Committee reprinted the ABA resolution in favor of uniform
federal rules of evidence. Notably absent from the ABA resolution was any mention of the
Model Code of Evidence. Instead, there was an explicit statement that a drafting committee
"adapt the Uniform Rules of Evidence." Id. at 113.
233. 21 Wright & Graham, Federal Practice at § 5006.
234. Professor Cleary graduated from the University of Illinois Law School in 1932
and received his J.S.D. in 1933 from Yale Law School. He taught at the University of
Illinois from 1946 to 1967 and at Arizona State University from 1967 to 1977, when he
retired. "Biography of Edward W. Cleary," 1977 Ariz. St. LJ. 245. See also "Tribute to
Edward W. Cleary," 1991 U. Ill. L Rev 250. Cleary died in January 1990.
235. Rules of Evidence, Pub. L. 93-595, 88 Stats. 1296 (1974).
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vague generalities and constricting particularity, except as individual situa-
tions might require a variation in treatment."2 36 It was as if the Advisory
Committee had heard Morgan explain why neither the Wigmore nor the
Clark approach was acceptable and then followed the path created by
Morgan. Thus, the Federal Rules were designed to rely heavily on judicial
discretion.2 37 Clearly, reasoned elaboration pointed the drafters of the
Federal Rules in the direction of using judicial discretion to resolve most
evidentiary disputes. Giving the trial judge the discretion to admit or ex-
clude evidence with limited appellate review was believed to comport bet-
ter with our notions of the imperfectability of trials. Even more
pragmatically (and efficiently), the theory of discretion in the Federal Rules
permits the trial judge some confidence that her decision, if appealed, will
be upheld and permits the appellate courts to focus their attention on
issues other than evidentiary claims. Finally, drafting a uniform body of
rules applicable to all disputes revived the claim that the Federal Rules
created a greater efficiency in the administration of justice, a claim tracea-
ble to legal progressivism.
But the rationale for granting the trial court discretion to make evi-
dentiary rulings, as articulated by Morgan, was not only to account for the
imperfectibility of trials (and to avoid the sporting theory of justice) but
also to acknowledge that the goal of the trial was not to ascertain truth but
to provide an orderly resolution for disputes. Prominently placed at the
beginning of the Federal Rules of Evidence was Rule 102, which assumed
that the justification for the rules of evidence remained the discovery of
truth.2 38 Jurisprudentially, then, the Federal Rules allow the legal profes-
sion to speak of the goals of justice and truth while creating an evidentiary
code which avoids facing the problem of truth.2 39
236. Proposed Federal Rules of Evidence: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Reform of Federal
Criminal Laws of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 93d Cong. 1st Sess. 91 (1973) (statement
of Professor Cleary).
237. See Fed. R. Evid. 403 (giving the trial court the discretion to exclude relevant
evidence if "its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair preju-
dice"). See generally Thomas M. Mengler, "The Theory of Discretion in the Federal Rules
of Evidence," 74 Iowa L Rev. 413 (1989); Jon R. Waltz, "Judicial Discretion in the Admis-
sion of Evidence under the Federal Rules of Evidence," 79 Nw. L Rev. 1097 (1984-85).
238. Fed. R. Evid. 102. This rule was in the preliminary draft of the FRE and re-
mained unchanged throughout the drafting process. The drafters chose not to attempt to
split the difference, as attempted by Hart & McNaughton in a 1958 article. Hart & Mc-
Naughton, "Evidence and Inference" at 45 (cited in note 136). (In a lawsuit "something
more is at stake than the truth only of the specific matter in contest. There is at stake also
that confidence of the public generally in the impartiality and fairness of public settlement
of disputes").
239. Thus, I think it wrong to assume that the procedural reformers of the 1930s and
1940s were naive in their reliance on the good faith of judges and government. Instead, they
seemed well aware of the limitations of trial courts, as indicated by one of Morgan's last
essays on evidentiary reform. See Edmund M. Morgan, "Practical Difficulties Impeding Re-
form in the Law of Evidence," 14 Vand. L Rev. 725, 734-35 (1961) (criticizing Professor
David Louisell's suggestion that real reform lay in selecting and securing good trial judges as
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III. CONCLUSION
The search for an autonomy of law from politics and the search for a
rationality in judicial decision making led to reforms predicated on judicial
discretion. In codifying the law of evidence, the drafters of the Model
Code pinned their belief in progress on the rationality of the rules and the
actors applying the rules. This became necessary after realists showed that
truth was no longer a defensible goal of the rules of evidence.
The Federal Rules of Evidence is the latest attempt to rationalize a
particular branch of the law. It is both a restatement of the law and a
desperate attempt to reconstruct law as Law as autonomous. I mean sim-
ply this: The history of American legal thought since World War II is the
effort to find a solution to the "twinned" problems of the relationship of
law and morality and of idiosyncratic judging. Both problems present is-
sues testing our commitment to notions of impartiality and neutrality, jus-
tice and fairness, and the guiding ideal of the rationality and progress of
law. These notions make up much of the "core" of a belief in the Rule of
Law. While there are still clarion calls for a return to a formalism and Law
that probably never existed-particularly in the statements of those who
want judges to "interpret the law, not make it"2 40 -the jurisprudential re-
sponse to realism, in the form of reasoned elaboration, was an attempt to
limit judges to making good law.2 4 1 The project of reasoned elaboration
was not to search for a nonexistent objectivity but to constrain the subjec-
tivity of judges and judicial decision making through requirements includ-
ing professional craft, critique by scholars, abnegation of power or
deference to other branches, and a reasoned articulation of decisions.2 42
Constraints on judicial subjectivity would return law from the abyss (or
abuse) of politics. While those affiliated with reasoned elaboration di-
rected most of their concerns to decision making in the Supreme Court,2 43
the project of the (First) Restatement was an earlier attempt to curb the
discretion of state courts by creating certainty and uniformity in compiling
"black letter" rules on various doctrinal subjects.2 44 By 1953, the (Second)
"opposing a proposal for a reform which lies in the sphere of present probability by shifting
to a proposal for a more far-reaching change that is beyond the range of adoption in the
foreseeable future").
240. See, e.g., Luther v. Borden, 7 How. (48 U.S.) 1, 41 (1852) ("It is the province of
the court to expound the law, not to make it").
241. Hart & Sacks, The Legal Process (cited in note 205).
242. This short and biased summary is more thoroughly stated in White, 59 Va. L Rev.
at 286-91 (cited in note 14). See also Bobbitt, Constitutional Fate 42-58 (cited in note 218).
One example in the law of evidence is Cleary's essay, "Preliminary Notes on Reading the
Rules of Evidence," 57 Neb. L Rev. 908 (1978), in which he suggests which materials ought
to be used in interpreting the FRE.
243. See especially Wechsler, 73 Harv. L Rev. (cited in note 224). See also Bobbitt,
Constitutional Fate 44-47.
244. See Gilmore, Ages of American Law 72-74 (cited in note 221).
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Restatement was being readied.245 The original Restatement was an at-
tempt to ensure an objectivity in law; the Second Restatement was an at-
tempt to domesticate the inherent subjectivity of law.246
The Model Code of Evidence was the first organized response to the
challenge to Law presented by legal realists. The Model Code explicitly
reconstructed the bases for the law of evidence in part to more broadly
protect Rule of Law beliefs. In reconstructing the law of evidence to pro-
vide a foundation for a renewed belief in the rule of law, however, the
Model Code failed to persuade the legal profession of the value of "radical
reform." Instead, the Model Code became a shell in which to place a
more comforting, less demanding code of evidence.
The Federal Rules of Evidence, although not enacted until 1975, are
structured within the framework of the legal thought of reasoned elabora-
tion, which in turn tried to resurrect legal progressive thought. To effec-
tively counter the problems posed by legal realism, reasoned elaboration,
unlike legal progressivism, downplayed both the goal of a trial as a search
for truth, and the general search for substantive justice apart from proce-
dural justice. The irony is twofold: first, the Federal Rules are structured
to deny the goal proclaimed in the Federal Rules, ascertaining the truth;
second, in an effort to "rationalize" the law of evidence, the Federal Rules
are justified as ends, not means. This required the subversion of the pro-
gressive claim that evidence was an instrument and an embrace of Thur-
man Arnold's claim of the inseparability of procedure and substance. The
very attempt to overcome the realist threat resulted in submission to realist
insights.
245. W. Noel Keyes, "The Restatement (Second): Its Misleading Quality and a Propo-
sal for Its Amelioration," 13 Pepperdine L Rev. 23, 28 (1985).
246. There is a very complex interaction regarding the relationship of the development
of the legal profession and legal education and their impact upon the American Law Insti-
tute's Restatement projects. My tentative thoughts are that the elite within the bar and legal
academia wanted to use the (First) Restatements both to create greater certainty and uni-
formity in the law of various states and to ensure a form of control over the legal systems of
the various states. By the time of the (Second) Restatements, the main purpose was to create
opportunities for graduated doctrinal change, like § 402A of the Restatement (Second) of
Torts, given the assumption of the subjectivity of legal decision making. See Herbert Wechs-
ler, "Restatements and Legal Change: Problems of Policy in the Restatement Work of the
American Law Institute," 13 Saint Louis U.LJ. 185 (1969); compare W. Noel Keyes, 13 Pep-
perdine L Rev., with John W. Wade, "The Restatement (Second): A Tribute to Its Increas-
ingly Advantageous Quality, and an Encouragement to Continue the Trend," 13 Pepperdine
L Rev. 59 (1985). Cf. Hull, 8 Law & Hist. Rev. (cited in note 13) (concluding that the
creation of the ALl was a product of "progressive-pragmatists," whose interest in the reform
of law was antithetical to the conservative interests of formalists interested in freezing law).
See generally G. Edward White, Tort Law in America: An Intellectual History 139-79 (paper
ed. New York: Oxford University Press, 1985).
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